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I examine the interrelationship between industrial concentration, the CES in-
dustry price index and trade policy when a subset of firms in the market takes the
effect of their decisions on industry aggregates into account.
In the first chapter, I develop a hybrid model that augments the standard
monopolistic competition approach in the international trade literature to include
an oligopolistic margin: a set of foreign and domestic heterogeneous granular firms
competing in quantities. This margin predicts novel effects of trade liberalization
on trade, consumer welfare, and industrial concentration. Specifically, trade liber-
alization generates lower consumer gains when foreign firms are more concentrated
than domestic, and higher domestic industrial concentration of granular firms.
In the second chapter, I study the implications of hybrid competition for the
gravity equation. I show that the trade cost elasticity is attenuated by foreign firm
concentration and I test the novel oligopolistic margin using diff-in-diff variation
from trade policy changes in Colombia. I find robust evidence for this margin. I
also show that the aggregate impact of trade liberalization can be substantially
reduced by oligopolistic behavior. Moreover, foreign concentration heterogeneity
across origin countries suggests a highly heterogeneous impact of trade liberalization:
imports from countries in the top decile of concentration had 13 log points lower
growth on average than imports from countries in the bottom decile.
In the third chapter, I explore the implications of the hybrid model when
there is trade policy uncertainty. When firms are uncertain about future tariffs and
exporting involves sunk investments, the value of waiting increases. In the setting
I propose, potential entrants also consider the strategic reaction of oligopolistic
competitors: when domestic granular firms are highly concentrated, the impact of
trade policy uncertainty on foreign entry is mitigated since the eventual increase in
tariffs is predicted to be partially offset by an increase in domestic markups. When
foreign granular exporters are highly concentrated, the impact is amplified since the
increase in tariffs is predicted to not be fully passed to the price index. I discuss
an empirical application in the context of Brexit uncertainty and potential ways
forward.
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Chapter 1: A Model of Hybrid Competition in International Trade
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, interest in industrial concentration has been fueled by evi-
dence showing an increase in this measure in the US, Japan and European countries
(OECD, 2018, Bajgar et al., 2019).1 Over the same period of time, the decrease
in trade barriers has made competition between domestic and foreign firms a more
common feature of markets. In this chapter, I propose a theory that establishes a
link between industrial concentration, competition and trade policy.
Large firms dominate international trade.2 It has been shown that the top five
exporters account for an average of about 30% of country exports and explain about
half of its variation in developing countries (Freund and Pierola, 2015); whereas the
top decile accounts for an 95% of total exports in average in the US (Bernard et al.,
2018), and an average of 87% in European countries (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008).3
1In the case of the US, the rise in the relative importance of large firms has been associated
with other secular trends such as the decline in the labor share of income and the rise of superstar
firms (Autor et al., 2017; Autor et al., 2019), the decrease in domestic competition and investment
(Gutierrez and Philippon, 2018, Grullon et al., 2019), and the rise of markups (De Loecker et al.,
2020).
2I use the terms “large” and “granular” interchangeably, and the term “small” for nongranular
firms throughout the dissertation.
3Freund and Pierola (2015) employ the Export Dynamic Database (EDD), a World Bank
database that included 32 developing countries at the time they published the paper.
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Despite this evidence, standard trade models with heterogeneous firms leave little
room for the role of large firms in their mechanism through which changes in trade
costs affect trade flows and consumer welfare.4 Given that, I investigate a channel
through which large firms can differ: their oligopolistic behavior.5
In this chapter, I theoretically examine the interrelation between industrial
concentration, the CES industry price index and trade policy. I extend the stan-
dard model of international trade in which monopolistically competitive firms with
heterogeneous productivity produce differentiated varieties by adding a set of more
productive granular firms. These origin-specific large firms sell their varieties in
the domestic market and take the impact of their decisions on industry aggregates
into account.6 This model allows me to identify a novel channel through which
trade liberalization affects competition: I find that relative industrial concentra-
tion between domestic and foreign firms matters in determining the total impact of
trade liberalization on the industry price index. When domestic firms are relatively
more concentrated, a tariff reduction shifts demand towards the less concentrated,
lower aggregate markup segment of the market, magnifying the impact of tariffs
on the price index. This mechanism is especially important the more productive
4Head and Spencer (2017) show that the share of papers published in the top field journal
(JIE) mentioning “monopolistic competition” and “heterogeneous firms”, two features of the stan-
dard model, surged in the 2000s and continued increasing in the 2010s. On the contrary, papers
mentioning “oligopoly” continuously decreased since the 1990s. However, the authors identify a
promising resurgence of oligopoly models in the last years.
5Even though observing that large firms charge higher markups than small firms is not sufficient
to conclude they are behaving in an oligopolistic fashion, there is substantial empirical evidence
showing that the distribution of markups is positively skewed (De Loecker et al., 2016; De Loecker
et al., 2020), and firms price to market (Atkeson and Burstein, 2008). These two features suggest
oligopolistic behavior.
6The workhorse model with heterogeneous firms was introduced by Melitz (2003) and modified
by Chaney (2008) to focus on the gravity equation implications. In this paper I focus on the
industry level version of this model where I take income as given.
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oligopolistic firms are with respect to small monopolistic competitive firms.
The model allows me to study how trade liberalization affects domestic con-
centration. I formally show that trade liberalization increases domestic concentra-
tion if oligopolistic domestic firms have a higher market share than monopolistic
competitive domestic firms. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first struc-
tural domestic concentration equation that relates domestic concentration to the
CES industry price index. I decompose the effect of competition on a widely used
concentration measure, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), into (i) the real-
location of market shares within large firms, (ii) the reallocation of market shares
within small firms through entry and exit, and (iii) the reallocation of market shares
between small and large firms. An increase in competition (i.e. a decrease in the
CES industry price index) leads to an increase in concentration within large firms
because larger, more productive firms face more competitive pressure and end up
with lower markups and thus lower prices. In the case of small firms, the sign of
such impact depends on their underlying productivity distribution. In the case of a
bounded Pareto distribution, the distribution I assume throughout the chapter, the
rise in competition increases domestic concentration.7 Finally, market share reallo-
cation between large and small firms depends on which group of domestic firms have
a higher market share. When large firms do, an increase in competition increases
concentration through this channel because large firms gain more market share (their
prices decrease and small firms exit). When small firms do, such reallocation lowers
7Given that the unbounded Pareto distribution is a special case of the distribution I use, the
result also holds for it.
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concentration because it shifts demand away from small firms. 8
The model can be used to study and quantify the potential relationship be-
tween the increase in import penetration and the increase in domestic concentration
many countries have experienced in the last two decades. In light of the model, an
increase in the productivity of foreign firms would increase the competitive pressure
firms in other countries face, causing large firms to decrease their prices and less
productive small firms to exit, increasing concentration. I calibrate the model to
parameter values commonly used in the literature to numerically illustrate this and
show that the model can imply an increase in domestic concentration of about 2
percentage points and a reduction in the number of small domestic firms of about
55% when import prices are halved.9
I contribute to understanding the role of industrial concentration in interna-
tional trade when large firms have oligopolistic behavior. Industrial concentration
does not have a distortive role at the industry level when consumers have CES
preferences (cf. Dhingra and Morrow, 2019).10 Therefore, models covered by the
seminal Arkolakis et al. (2012) provide no insights in this regard. Arkolakis et al.
(2018) depart from CES preferences to allow for variable markups, but they assume
8Autor et al. (2019) argue that the fall of the labor share in the US is due to the reallocation of
market shares from low to high productivity firms, which have higher markups. That mechanism
is consistent with reallocation from small to large firms in my model due to tougher competition.
9Between 1997 and 2012, the HHI rose between 1 and 4 percentage points in manufacturing
sectors in the US (Gutierrez and Philippon, 2017), and based on US Census data the number of
manufacturing firms fell by about 20%.
10Nocke and Schutz (2018) show that concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index can capture the impact of welfare distortions on consumer surplus due to oligopolistic be-
havior around a monopolistic competitive setting under a general family of consumer preference,
including CES. I show that the HHI is proportional to the industrial concentration measure I
propose.
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away the role of market structure in welfare.11 My model allows for both distortive
and non-distortive firm behavior and stresses the importance of specific differences
in the realized productivity distributions of large firms across their origins.
The theoretical role of industrial concentration in international trade models
depends on how consumers preferences, competition and firms’ productivity distri-
bution are modeled. For example, firm concentration is associated with decreasing
welfare gains of new varieties in Feenstra and Weinstein (2018): a decrease in over-
all concentration is interpreted as a less crowded product space, which increases
welfare.12 In my model, the fact that CES preferences are neutral in terms of the
market power of small firms implies that the distortive role of country-specific indus-
trial concentration necessarily comes from the state of competition in the market. In
this sense, the ability of large firms to charge high markups depends both on all the
firms acting in the market and on the distribution of prices across origins, includ-
ing ad-valorem tariffs. Therefore, the pro-competitive effect of trade liberalization
depends on foreign firms who benefit from trade liberalization and domestic firms
who do not, especially when markets are highly integrated and the overall share of
granular firms is high.
I decompose the impact of tariffs on the CES industry price index into a
direct price effect, a relative concentration effect, an entry effect and a cross-size
11They assume monopolistic competition and a common unbounded Pareto distribution for
firms’ productivities across countries.
12In the welfare formula they derive, the product variety term includes the overall Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), which positively impacts welfare. The authors argue that this term
captures crowding of the variety space: a high HHI implies a low number of firms and thus fewer
varieties. Nonetheless, we can write HHI = (1+CV 2)N−1, where CV is the coefficient of variation
of sales and N is the number of firms, to see that high concentration does not necessarily mean a
low N .
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effect, and show that trade liberalization always decreases it. The entry effect dis-
appears under unbounded Pareto distribution, illustrating that welfare gains from
variety are only present when the productivity distribution is bounded, as argued by
Feenstra (2018). The two other terms are novel in the context of the standard mo-
nopolistic model with heterogeneous firms. The relative concentration term arises
from the existence of large firms, whereas the cross-size effect summarizes how large
and small firms react to each other. Redding and Weinstein (2018) do a different
decomposition of the CES price index and conclude that firm dispersion within sec-
tors can increase consumer welfare given that consumers can substitute away from
high demand-adjusted prices. In my model firm dispersion in large firms captures
lower misallocation conditional on the underlying productivity distribution because
it implies lower markups. However, relative dispersion as identified by relative con-
centration captures the relative first-order response of markups between foreign and
domestic firms. Hence, my decomposition isolates the pro-competitive effect due to
oligopolistic behavior.
To the best of my knowledge, Parenti (2018) was the first to construct an
international trade model in which small and large firms compete.13 My model
differs from his in two key aspects. First, I assume firm heterogeneity within each
group of firms and therefore I am able to nest standard industry trade models with
a continuum of heterogeneous firms. Specifically, my model can be understood as an
extension of Melitz and Redding (2015), which features heterogeneous small firms
13Shimomura and Thisse (2012) were the first to construct a hybrid model where homogeneous
large and small firms interact but in a closed economy.
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and bounded Pareto productivity distribution but no firm granularity. Therefore,
I contribute to the existing literature by adding an extra margin of adjustment in
trade capturing market power. Second, Parenti (2018) assumes that large firms
can decide both prices and the number of products they produce and therefore his
setting is richer along that dimension.1415 Finally, the focus of his paper is different
too. In my case, I focus on the role of industrial concentration in international trade,
showing that it can capture markup responses and be affected by competition in
a setting with firm turnover. Parenti (2018) focuses on how trade liberalization
conclusions can differ from other papers with homogeneous firms such as Krugman
(1979) due to granularity.
I also contribute to the body of papers that allows for oligopolistic behavior
in international trade models. Head and Spencer (2017) argue for the importance
of accounting for large firms given the aforementioned evidence and the fact that
they can modify theoretical and empirical predictions. Edmond et al. (2015) study
the impact of trade liberalization on welfare by using a oligopolistic model with
heterogeneous firms.16 Even though the underlying mechanism in the case of large
firms is the same, my model allows for the inclusion of entry of small firms as in
standard models of trade with monopolistic competition. Given the long tail of
14My model can be extended to allow large firms to be multiproduct. Given that both large and
small firms are heterogeneous in my model, conclusions may differ from Parenti (2018). I leave
this extension for future research.
15There are other channels through which large firms can modify the impact of trade liber-
alization. For instance, Ludema and Yu (2016) focus on the quality upgrade mechanism: high
productivity firms have a low pass-through due to their choice of high quality products, especially
in products with high quality scope.
16Other relevant questions that were already addressed are how oligopolistic firms can influence
aggregate trade flows (Eaton et al., 2012), the exchange rate pass-through (Amiti et al., 2014;
Auer and Schoenle, 2015), the comparative advantage of countries (Gaubert and Itshoki, 2018),
and the strategic complementarities between foreign and domestic firms (Amiti et al., 2019).
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small firms usually observed in trade data and the relatively lower exit probability
of large firms, I argue that constructing a hybrid model can help in both solving
the technical limitations imposed by oligopoly models and addressing the differential
market power of large firms.1718 Moreover, the focus of this chapter is not to quantify
the gains from trade under misallocation as it was theirs, but rather to identify and
characterize the specific role of large firms in microfounding industrial concentration.
The analysis relating the impact of tariffs on the price index generalizes results
of the classical literature about strategic trade policy. Helpman and Krugman (1989)
show that in a duopoly with a foreign and a domestic firm playing Cournot in the
domestic economy, the terms of trade are more likely to improve when tariffs decrease
than in the case where domestic firms are perfectly competitive. The intuition is the
same: opening to trade imposes competitive pressure on the domestic firm. This
is not the case if the two firms play Bertrand, since the resulting increase in the
foreign firm’s price may cause the domestic firm to increase the price too. My setting
avoids this possibility by assuming imperfect substitutability of foreign and domestic
varieties. Therefore, Cournot and Bertrand assumptions deliver qualitatively similar
predictions.
In Section 2 I argue that the hybrid model is a natural and practical way
of extending the standard heterogeneous firms trade model to include large firms’
17Eaton et al. (2007) show that exporters in the top quintile at t have a probability of 90% of
continuing exporting at t+ 1. This probability decreases monotonically towards the fifth quintile,
where exporters at t only have a probability of 24% of surviving at t+ 1.
18Neary (2016) characterizes the technical difficulties of modeling oligopolistic markets and devel-
ops a general equilibrium model where a fixed number of country and sector-specific homogeneous
firms that helps him overcome some of the issues. However, his model does not feature entry nor
firm heterogeneity.
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market power. I develop the model in Section 3 and present the main theoretical
results in Sector 4, which I illustrate in Section 5 by means of a numerical exercise.
Section 6 concludes by discussing future avenues for research.
1.2 A Discussion on Hybrid Competition
In international trade theory, papers employing models with monopolistic com-
petition and models with oligopoly have followed different paths and rarely addressed
the same type of questions (cf. Head an Spencer, 2017). On the one hand, recent
models using oligopoly have been mostly concerned with questions related to gains
from trade due to misallocation (e.g. Edmond et al., 2015). On the other hand,
models with monopolistic competition have mostly addressed questions related to
firm selection and productivity (e.g. Melitz, 2003). In this section, I argue that
constructing a hybrid model, where a subset of firms affects industry aggregates
and other subset does not, both allows me to characterize the role of industrial
concentration and is in line with empirical evidence.
The basic fact that motivates having firms behaving differently depending on
their size comes from evidence showing that larger, more productive firms charge
higher markups (De Loecker et al., 2016). Yet this fact alone does not justify having
a hybrid theory since it can be obtained by assuming consumer preferences where
more productive firms face a lower elasticity of demand, even with atomistic firms
(e.g. quadratic preferences as in Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). There are two other
pieces of evidence suggesting that having large firms behaving as small can be a
9
strong assumption not suitable for addressing all trade-related research questions.
First, there is evidence that the markup distribution is positively skewed. De Loecker
et al. (2020) show that firms at the 90th percentile charge markups that almost
double those at the median.19 Second, concentration in export markets tends to be
high. Bernard et al. (2018) show that firms in the top decile of total trade account
for 96% of the total, and among them, those in the top percentile account for 82%
in the US. Therefore, assuming that top 1% firms, which account for almost 80%
of total trade across industries in the US, do not internalize the impact of their
decisions on industry aggregates may conflict with profit maximizing behavior.
High trade concentration is not limited to the US. In order to show evidence
for other countries, I use the ten largest countries in terms of exports included in the
Export Dynamic Database (EDD). In Figure 1.1 I graph the export concentration
distribution across exporter-importer-industries as measured by the market share of
the top 1% and 25% exporting firms in terms of exports.
There are two observations to be made about this figure. First, the top 1% of
firms that exports to a specific country at a given industry accounts for a third of
total exports in average, and the top 25% account for more than 80%, suggesting
that the so-called Pareto principle holds in average in this case.2021
The counterpart of having top firms accounting for a high proportion of export
markets is having many small firms with relatively low market shares. To illustrate
19This evidence is for domestic US firms.
20These calculations are not strictly comparable to the ones for the US, since the level of aggre-
gation in this case is 2 digits of the Harmonized System (HS), whereas it is total trade in the case
of the US.
21The Pareto principle states that about 80% of a phenomenon can be attributed to a 20% of
the observations.
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Figure 1.1: Industrial Concentration Distribution across Bilateral Flows for Selected
Exporters.
Average Share of top
1% firms : 0.33
Average Share of top
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Distribution of the share of top 1% and 25% exporting firms across exporter-importer-HS2 trade flows in 2007.
Ten largest exporting countries in the Export Dynamic Database (World Bank) based on the share of world
exports: Bangladesh, Chile, Denmark, Spain, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Portugal, and South Africa.
this, I employ custom export data from Colombia at the importer-product level
and I estimate the empirical CDF of firm-level market shares for importer-products
with 5, 10 and 20 exporters in 2007. For example, half of exporters have less than
1% export share in trade flows with 20 firms, as shown in Figure 1.2.22 Therefore,
assuming oligopolistic behavior in all firms may be a high price to pay given that
oligopolistic models with heterogeneous firms cannot be analytically solved with
firm entry, an important source of gains from trade.
The second feature of Figure 1.1 that I highlight is that export concentration is
highly heterogeneous across industries and destinations. The most commonly used
productivity distribution in the literature of firm heterogeneity in international trade
22Export shares are an upper bound for the real market share these firms have in import markets,
since they compete with firms from other origins, including domestic ones.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Colombian Exporters’ Market Shares across Importer-
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Each observation is a Colombian firm exporting a HS6 product to a specific importing country in 2007. Data from
DANE Colombia.
is the unbounded Pareto distribution (cf. Head et al., 2014). Under monopolistic
competition, this distribution delivers that the share of the top kth quantile of firms
is constant, regardless of where the entry productivity cutoff is. This figure shows
that either the Pareto distribution or monopolistic competition do not hold for these
exporters, given that the distribution should be degenerate under CES preferences.
The previous result opens the door for alternative characterizations of the
observed distribution of export sales. In this regard, there is evidence that the
top part of the distribution is not fit well by the unbounded Pareto (e.g. Head
et al., 2014; Hottman et al., 2016). In the hybrid model I assume that there is
a productivity level above which firms can internalize their impact on industry
aggregates. The rationale beneath is that doing so may imply spending resources
and therefore only productive enough firms could afford it. Above that productivity
12
level, predicted sales should be lower than what a model assuming an unbounded
Pareto would predict, which is in line with the aforementioned evidence.
Finally, the importance of large firms has increased in export markets in the
last years, suggesting that accounting for differential large firm behavior may have
become more important recently. Figure 1.3 shows this evidence using the same
sample of ten countries from the EDD as before. Notably, the share of top 1%
exporters grew more than the share of top 25% over the 2001-2014 period.
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t + δcdh + ucdpt, where X is the market share
of top k firms, c is the exporter, d is the importer, p is the HS2 product, and t is the year. Omitted year is 2007.
Robust standard errors. Ten largest exporting countries in the Export Dynamic Database (World Bank) based on
the share of world exports: Bangladesh, Chile, Denmark, Spain, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Portugal, and
South Africa.
In conclusion, developing a hybrid model allows me to exploit useful features
of both oligopolistic and monopolistic competitive models, depending on the type
of firm, without contradicting the empirical evidence. On the one hand, it allows
me to assume that large firms have market power because they are not myopic
13
about their size, which means that market power arises not because of a choice of
consumer preferences but in spite of that. On the other hand, having small firms
modeled as a continuum allows me to incorporate firm turnover on the left tail of
the productivity distribution, where it is more predominant, along with oligopolistic
firms on the right tail.
1.3 Model
In this section, I develop the hybrid model focusing on the role of firm con-
centration and its relationship with the standard international trade model with
heterogeneous firms.
1.3.1 Environment
In a given industry, there are an exogenous number of domestic and foreign
active firms, N ld and N
l
f respectively, that decide the optimal quantity they produce
of different varieties of a good. These firms are granular, so they acknowledge the
impact of their choices on industry aggregates, and heterogeneous in their produc-
tivity. There is also a continuum of domestic and foreign small firms in the industry.
Foreign firms face an ad-valorem tariff τ in the domestic economy, so the price they
receive is p/τ . In addition, these firms face an ad-valorem unit cost Tf that captures
transport costs and input prices employed by foreign producers. Domestic firms face
an ad-valorem unit cost Td.
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1.3.2 Consumer Preferences
Consumers have CES preferences with elasticity of substitution σ > 1, which
is the same across all varieties, regardless of being produced by small or large firms;
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where subscripts index origin (foreign or domestic), superscripts index type of
firms (large or small), and Qs are the composite goods indicated by the superscripts
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in the case of large foreign firms. All firms face the inverse






σ E regardless of their type.
23I present expressions for foreign firms without loss of generality.
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1.3.3 Small Firms
Small firms do not affect industry aggregates individually and charge the fixed
markup µ̃ ≡ σ
σ−1 . They decide whether to enter into the domestic economy by
comparing the present discounting value of profits to the sunk cost of entry K. The




where πsf,∗ ≡ σ̃τ−σ(csf,∗)1−σ( PTf )
σ−1E, and β < 1 is the exogenous probability

















where 1/csH is the lower productivity bound, 1/c
s
L is the upper
productivity bound, and k is the shape parameter. In order to provide rationale for
the coexistence of large and small firms, I assume that the upper productivity bound
is smaller than the least productive large firm.25 As a result, large firms cannot be
less productive than small firms.26
24σ̃ ≡ (σ − 1)σ−1σ−σ
25If I order large firms unit costs’ in descending order, this assumption implies that csL > c
l
f,1.
Moreover, this is in line with Hottman et al. (2016) where they show that the distribution of
firms’ sales does not follow an unbounded Pareto distribution due to very large top firms (log sales
vs. log rank of firms is convex). My model is flexible in that regard and can accommodate any
distribution of large firms’ productivities.
26This suggests the following rationalization: ex-ante, firms decide to enter based on the bounded
Pareto distribution. However, there is a sufficiently low probability of becoming granular and
receiving a higher productivity. Since the probability of this event is close to zero, small firms do
16
Finally, note that domestic expressions are the same but with τ = 1.
1.3.4 Large Firms




27 All large firms compete in quantities, which
means that they decide the optimal level of production by also taking into account
how they impact the aggregate quantity indexQ. Therefore, the first-order condition
of a large foreign firm is as follows: 28









where the domestic expression is analogous. On the left hand side we can
observe the standard marginal gain of increasing the quantity produced since it is
the difference between the market price plf,i and the effective unit cost. The first
term on the right hand side captures the marginal cost of increasing the quan-
tity produced since doing so generates a movement along the demand curve that
decreases the price, a mechanism that is also present in the case of small firms.
However, large firms recognize that by increasing quantity, they are also increas-
ing the quantity index and thus reducing the industry price index. This increases









σ , which shows that increasing q increases the marginal cost
not consider that when comparing expected profits to the sunk cost of entry.
27We can interpret the observed distribution of unit costs as a realization of an unknown pro-
ductivity distribution where large firms have a technology that allows them to retain such received
productivity.
28Derivation in Appendix A.1.1.
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of choosing a higher quantity relative to monopolistic competition the higher the
σ.29 This means that large firms produce less relative to a monopolistically com-
petitive setting the more productive they are because the marginal cost of doing so
increases with the market share.30
The optimality condition captured by equation 1.5 delivers the following firm-
specific optimal markup:31
µlf,i = µ̃× (1− slf,i)−1 (1.6)
where µ̃ ≡ σ
σ−1 is the markup that the firm would charge under monopolistic
competition.32 Therefore, this model of competition delivers a variable markup
that increases with the market share even under CES preferences. The underlying
determinant of such market power is the demand elasticity ν the firm perceives,
which decreases with its size:33
−νlf,i = (slf,i + (1− slf,i)/σ)−1 (1.7)
29Note that given the CES demand function qlf,i = (p
l
f,i)





30Note that when σ is relatively small the marginal cost of increasing the quantity actually
decreases when producing more because the increase in profits due to the increase in the market
share offsets the negative effect of an increase in competition (i.e. the increase in market power
offsets the decline in the price index). This means that even though larger firms will always
produce less than under monopolistic competition, they will be closer to that level of production
than smaller firms.
31Note that this result is analogous to the one shown by Nocke and Schutz (2018) under CES
preferences when we assume that firms produce one variety.
32Note that it is the same expression as in Amiti et al. (2019) when the elasticity of substitution
across industries is equal to 1 (η in their paper). I assume this elasticity of substitution to focus
on the effect of intra-industry and cross-country reallocation of market shares.
33Assuming price competition delivers similar qualitative predictions.
18
1.3.5 Industry Equilibrium
Given the fixed distribution of productivities of large foreign and domestic
firms, the unit costs shifters, Td and Tf , the trade policy variable τ , the survival
probability of small firms β, the sunk cost of entry K, and the distribution of small
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for r ∈ (f, d) and i = 1...N lr, where τd = 1.
Firms’ market shares slr,i are defined relative to the entire market. However,
we can define the following equilibrium market shares that are useful in subsequent
derivations.
Definition 1 Given firm types r̃ ∈ {(d, l), (d, s), (f, l), (f, s)} and the industry equi-
librium defined in equations 1.8-1.14, the market share of firm i within its type is
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Definition 2 Given the industry equilibrium defined in equations 1.8-1.14, aggre-
gate equilibrium market shares are defined as:























where r ∈ (f, d).
Given definitions 1 and 2, foreign firm i’s overall market share can be written











In this section, I derive the main theoretical results which establish the rela-
tionship between industrial concentration, the CES industry price index, and trade
liberalization. I first show that large firms’ markup responses to competition can
be understood as a concentration measure in the aggregate. I then show that trade
liberalization decreases the CES industry price index and increases domestic con-
centration.
In order to do so, I define an increase in competition as follows:
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Definition 3 Any shock that decreases the CES industry price index P is a shock
that increases competition.
In this model, a decrease in P causes both downward pressure on large firms’
markups and exit of less-productive small firms. These are two features present in
many oligopolistic and monopolistic competitive models that are generally inter-
preted as characteristics of more competitive environments. Therefore, I use P to
capture changes in the state of competition.
1.4.1 Industrial Concentration
1.4.1.1 Relative Market Shares
In the standard model with a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms,
the role of industrial concentration is limited to reflecting the underlying produc-
tivity distribution intermediated by the elasticity of substitution conditional on the
entry cutoff. Therefore, it is understandable that the international trade literature
did not pay much attention to its determinants. With granular firms this is differ-
ent. Changes in trade costs generate changes in the country-specific distribution of
market shares due to firm-specific heterogeneous pass-throughs. Moreover, changes
in trade costs do not need to directly affect firms to modify the distribution of shares
since changes in competition also affect large domestic firms’ markups. Therefore,
industrial concentration not only reflects the underlying productivity distribution
but also the state of competition in the industry.
Before formalizing the previous discussion, let’s first note the following:
21
d log slr,i = (1− σ)d log(plr,i/P ) (1.15)
which directly follows from equation 1.8. This means that a change in the
ratio of any exogenous consumer price determinant to the price index is a sufficient
statistic for a change in firm-specific overall market share. The reason is that it
captures both the direct impact of such effect and the overall change in competition,
which aggregates all markup and entry responses, including firm’s own.
The previous discussion implies that the effective impact of trade liberalization
on individual foreign firms’ market shares has to be measured by τ/P in the case
of foreign firms, and by 1/P in the case of domestic firms (given that there is no
direct effect of tariffs on their prices). The following proposition uses this idea to
establish the relative response of market shares to trade liberalization.
Proposition 1 Relative Market Shares Response to Trade Liberalization.
A decrease in effective tariffs, τ/P , that increases competition:







where clf,j > c
l
f,i; and








where cld,j′ > c
l
d,i′.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.1.









where r ∈ (f, d).34 Note that this elasticity is increasing in firm i market
share, which indicates that larger firms react more strongly to changes in either
trade costs or competition.35 For instance, a decrease in tariffs leads to higher
markup increases by relatively more productive foreign firms and thus lowers their
share relative to their less productive foreign competitors.36 Domestic firms will face
more competition once tariffs go down, and as a result their markups will decrease.
34I follow Amiti et al. (2019) in defining a term ψlr,i as the negative of the markup elasticity.




36The underlying mechanism can be understood by examining equation 1.5: Even though the
decline in tariffs increases the marginal gain of increasing production, a relatively more productive
firm i, given its relatively larger size, acknowledges that it need not to increase production as much
as less productive firm j to equate those gains to the marginal costs of increasing production. As a
result, firm i increases production less than firm j and the decline in plr,i is lower than the decline
in plf,j , inducing i’s markup to increase more as a consequence.
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The relatively more productive firms will do so at a greater extent and therefore
will gain market share.
1.4.1.2 Concentration Measures
In order to address how industrial concentration relates to the CES industry
price index and trade flows, and how trade liberalization affects concentration, we
need to have a general definition of industrial concentration as a benchmark.
Definition 4 Given a set of market shares {si}Ni=1, where
∑N
i=1 si = S, a func-
tion C({si}Ni=1) =
∑N
i=1m(si) is a proper industrial concentration measure
if a mean-preserving spread, C({si + ∆i(si)}Ni=1), where
∑N




Definition 4 is satisfied by most of the widely used concentration measures
such as the HHI, the Theil index and the share of top firms when the spread is
such that shares are distributed between top and non-top firms.
In order to understand how concentration enters into the model, let’s examine











The measure Ψlr is the weighted average of large firms’ equilibrium responses




equilibrium markup response to changes in determinants of its own prices (e.g. tariff
in the case of foreign firms).
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The importance of this object for the theoretical implications of the model is
captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Large Firms Price Index and Concentration. The function
Ψlr is a proper industrial concentration measure.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.2.
Proposition 2 establishes that concentration of firms is embedded in the indus-
trial equilibrium because it captures the aggregate markup response to changes in
competition. To fix ideas, we can further relate this measure to a widely used con-
centration measure, the HHI, by doing a first order approximation around σ = 2:37














is proportional to HHI lr.
38 In this sense, concentration is microfounded by the
model.
1.4.2 Industry Price Index
In this section I examine how tariffs affect the CES industry price index in the
hybrid model. To do so, let’s first define the small firms’ analogous expression to
Ψlr:
37Derivation in Appendix A.1.2.













In contrast to large firms, small firms do not respond individually to changes
in competition since their markups are fixed. Nonetheless, when P increases, more
firms enter decreasing P sr . Therefore, the price index of small and large firms react
in opposite directions to changes in competition. The function Λsr is proportional to
the hazard function λsr of the bounded Pareto distribution of export sales, as shown
by Melitz and Redding (2015).39
In the following proposition I identify the new channel introduced by large
firms through which trade liberalization can affect competition and thus consumers
in the context of the standard model.
Proposition 3 Industry Price Index Elasticity. (a) The elasticity of the price
index with respect to tariffs can be decomposed into a (i) price term (1.22), (ii) a
relative large firms concentration term (1.23), (iii) relative small firms entry term





slf (1− slf )
H
(Ψld −Ψlf ) (1.23)
+ (1− hl)2
ssf (1− ssf )
H





ssf (1− slf )[Ψld + bΛsf ]− (1− ssf )slf [Ψlf + Λsd]
]
(1.25)
39The hazard function is exactly λsr = (σ − 1)Λsr.
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where H ≡ 1− hlΨl + (1− hl) Λs
σ−1 > 0 is the overall equilibrium response and









(b) The elasticity of the price index with respect to tariffs takes values between
0 and σ
σ−1 .
Proof: See Appendix A.2.3
There are two special cases that are worth highlighting in part (a). The first
one is when there are only small firms (N lf = N
l
d = 0). In that case, this expression
only retains the price effect and the term 1.24, which captures the gains from trade
due to product variety. In a symmetric setting, this term is positive as long as there
are more small domestic firms than small foreign firms in the industry, all else equal.
In the special case where the Pareto distribution is unbounded (csL = 0), this term
vanishes showing that there are no gains from trade due to product variety in the
standard monopolistic model, as argued by Feenstra (2018).
The second special case is when there are no small firms (csL = c
s
H). In this case,
the gains from trade only come from the pro-competitive term, 1.23, which captures
whether markups will decrease or increase depending on the relative concentration
between domestic and foreign large firms. Note that its sign is not determined
and depends on the specific productivity draws of granular firms. Given that this
mechanism is especially important when the market is evenly distributed (i.e. slf =
1/2), opening to trade when foreign firms are relatively more concentrated implies









. Details in the proof.
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In the case where there are both large and small firms, each of the previous
terms is qualified by how much more productive large firms are. This is captured
by hl: the more productive large firms are relative to small firms, the higher will be
their market share, even after taking into account their higher markups. In addition,
the terms 1.23 and 1.24 are not enough to capture the pro-competitive and product
variety gains from trade since there are cross-effects between the two types of firms,
as captured by term 1.25. For example, a decrease in tariffs will increase foreign
entry by more when Λsf is high, and therefore will amplify the tariff effect by further
decreasing domestic markups.
In part (b) of Proposition 3 I establish that the price index elasticity is always











> 0, the elasticity is
always positive and depends on the ratio of foreign to overall equilibrium responses.
1.4.3 Domestic Concentration
Given the evidence of an increase in domestic concentration in developed
economies, it is useful to study the predictions of this model in a setting where
foreign competition increases. In light of the model, such increase can be caused by
41Note that Ψlf ∈ (0, 1) and therefore 1− hlfΨlf > 0.
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any factor decreasing the relative price of imports such as tariffs or an increase in
foreign firms’ productivities.
I analyze the relationship between competition and domestic concentration by
means of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). In this regard, Proposition 4
decomposes and signs the elasticity of HHI with respect to the CES industry price
index:
Proposition 4 Domestic Concentration and Competition. (a) The elas-
ticity of domestic concentration as captured by the HHI with respect to the CES
industry price index depends on (i) within large firms market shares reallocation
(1.27), (ii) within small firms market share reallocation (1.28), and (iii) cross-size
market share reallocation (1.29):
d logHHId
d logP













+ 2(1− 2hld)(σ − 1)[Λsd + Ψld] (1.29)









is the hazard function of a bounded










(b) Any shock that increases competition increases domestic concentration
when the market share of large domestic firms is no smaller than the market share
of small domestic firms (hld ≥ 12).
29
Proof: See Appendix A.2.4.
We can analyze two special cases: only small and only large firms. In the first
case, the resulting expression is term 1.28 which only depends on the relationship
between two Pareto distribution with different shape parameters. The term λsd is
the usual hazard function of the distribution of sales with bounded Pareto, which
has shape parameter k − (σ − 1) and location csd,∗ under the usual condition that
k > σ−1; whereas the term λs2,d is the hazard function of a Pareto distribution that
weights individual sales differently depending on the concentration measure. In the
case of the HHI, the shape parameter of such Pareto distribution is k− 2(σ− 1).42
The sign of this term is always negative when using a Pareto distribution, and we






This expression captures the impact on the distribution of market shares that
happens only through firm turnover. Therefore, any shock that increases competi-
tion decreases P , which causes exit and an increase of surviving firms’ market shares
proportional to their productivity. In terms of the magnitude of this elasticity, the
higher is k, the higher will be the response of entry to competition because firms are
more homogeneous. Therefore, a decrease in P will reallocate more market share
towards surviving firms. When σ is high, entry is less responsive because residual
demand for potential entrants is lower. Therefore, HHId is less responsive to P .
42Using this concentration measure is only valid for industries with k > 2(σ − 1) given that the
shape parameter of a Pareto distribution is restricted to be positive.
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In the case with only large firms, the impact of P on HHId depends on the
reallocation of market shares due to changes in markups. This is captured by the
discrete weights that each function, P and HHI, assigns to each firm response, zld,i
and γld,i respectively. Its sign is always well-defined because HHI is an increasing
convex function in the unit interval, which implies assigning higher weights to rel-
atively larger firms. This means that the difference in weights, γld,i − zld,i, is higher
for the higher markup equilibrium responses. As a result, the impact of P on HHId
is negative.
When there are both large and small firms, a change in P will also reallocate
market shares across firm sizes as captured by term 1.29. Its sign is negative when
large firms have a higher market share than small firms. The intuition is that any
shock that increases competition decreases the price index of large domestic firms
and increases the price index of small domestic firm, reducing the relative price
of varieties produced by large firms. Hence, if hld > 1 − hld then the set of firms
that gains market share is the one that already had most of the market. Thus,
concentration increases.
1.5 Numerical Exercise
In this section I provide a numerical exercise to illustrate the mechanics of
the hybrid model and the role of concentration in the impact of tariffs and variable
trade costs on the CES price index and concentration.
31
1.5.1 Large Firms’ Productivities
The hybrid model does not impose any kind of restriction on the distribution
of productivities of domestic and foreign large firms. In this section, I interpret the





from an unbounded Pareto distribution Gl with shape parameter k and scale pa-
rameter 1/csL. This means that the productivity distribution of all firms, large and
small, can be understood as a compound of two distributions: the one for the small
firms and the distribution that generated the observed draws of large firms’ produc-
tivities.43
1.5.2 Parameters
In Table 2.9 I list the parameter values required to conduct a numerical exer-
cise.
Table 1.1: Parameter Values.
Parameter Definition Value Source/Explanation
k Pareto shape parameter 4.3 GI (2018)
σ Elasticity of substitution 4.5 Average GI2018-MR2015
csH Upper bound of the unit cost distribution 1 Normalization
csL Lower bound of the unit cost distribution 0.125 Implies average large firm productivity to be 8x relative to small firms
N lf , N
l
d Number of domestic and foreign large firms 4 Commonly used value to calculate concentration ratios (HS2017)
N Number of potential entrants 1000 Normalization
Ẽ ≡ E
K(1−β) Entry shifter 10000 Guarantees an internal solution
GI2018: Gaubert and Itshoki (2018), MR2015: Melitz and Redding (2015), HS2017: Head and Spencer (2017).
The two parameters that govern the curvature of the distribution of sales are
σ and k. I set σ = 4.5, which is the average between σ = 4, the value used in
Melitz and Redding (2015), which features a monopolistic competitive model and
43This implies that the overall productivity distribution is unbounded Pareto with scale param-
eter 1/csH . This is helpful to make the model potential comparable to a model with a continuum
or firms over the entire cost support (0, csH).
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truncated Pareto, and σ = 5, the one used in Gaubert and Itshoki (2018), which
features a pure oligopolistic model. In the case of k, values used in the literature do
not differ much and are between 4.25 and 4.5 in general. I choose 4.3 as in Gaubert
and Itshoki (2018).
I set csL = 0.125, which determines the relative productivity between small
and large, given the normalization csH = 1. This value implies that large firms are
assumed to be approximately 8 times more productive than small firms in average.44
I assume that there are four large domestic and foreign firms serving the do-
mestic market, N ld and N
l
f , given that it is a value traditionally used to measure the
degree of oligopoly tightness (cf. Head and Spencer, 2017). Moreover, it is a widely
used value to calculate concentration ratios.45
The rest of parameters/exogenous variables only affect entry directly. The
number of potential entrants N captures the degree of contestability in the mar-
ket given that it determines how many small firms could enter, imposing potential
competition on large firms. Consumer expenditure E, the entry cost K and the
discount factor β only modify the cost cutoff. I set N = 1000 as a normalization
and construct an entry shifter Ẽ ≡ E
K(1−β) . I assume it takes a value that guarantees
an internal solution (Ẽ = 10000).


















, which using the chosen parame-
ters is equal to 8.
45The US Census uses 4, 8, 20, and 50 top firms to calculate the share of top firms.
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1.5.3 Quantification
1.5.3.1 Numerical Comparative Statics
In Figure 1.4 I show the solution of the model at different variable trade costs.46
Figure 1.4: Hybrid Model Solution at Different Variable Trade Costs.
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Equilibrium solution at each level of trade costs using parameters in Table 1.1 and procedure in Appendix B.
In Panel 1.4a I plot the price index and each component relative to free trade
(P̂ = logPTf=T̄f − logPTf=1). The increase in trade costs causes more domestic en-
46Details of the solution in Appendix B
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try, which lowers P sd , but also causes large domestic firms to increase their markups,
which increases P ld. Foreign price indices increase as expected, with the large firm
price index increasing less due to markup reductions. The overall price index in-
creases, but substitution towards domestic varieties implies that at high trade costs
it is not as affected by them. This substitution can be seen in Panel 1.4b, where the
share of foreign firms decreases to less than 5% at Tf = 3.
Panels 1.4c and 1.4d show what happens with small and large firms when
trade costs increase. Given the imposed symmetry between the two countries, when
Tf = 1 there are the same number of foreign and domestic firms selling into the
industry, and the distribution of foreign and domestic market shares is the same in
the case of large firms. When trade costs increase, foreign firms exit and there is
more entry of domestic firms. In the case of concentration, an increase in trade costs
decreases concentration of large domestic firms, as captured by the HHI, because
large firms charge higher markups an therefore absorb less demand. The opposite
happens with large foreign firms. This illustrates the result in Proposition 4.
1.5.3.2 Trade Liberalization
Proposition 3 decomposes the impact of tariffs on the industry price index into
a price effect, a relative concentration term, a relative entry term, and a cross-size
term. In Table 1.2 I show such decomposition for an impact of 10 log points decrease
in tariffs at different levels of trade costs.
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Table 1.2: The Impact of 10 log points Reduction in Tariffs on the Industry Price
Index at Different Variable Trade Costs.
Direct Effect Relative Concentration Relative Entry Cross-size ImpactVariable
Trade Costs
Total
Change Contribution % Contribution % Contribution % Contribution %
1 -0.0500 -0.0500 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
1.5 -0.0358 -0.0345 96.4% -0.00213 5.97% -0.0000369 0.103% 0.000889 -2.48%
2 -0.0256 -0.0236 92.3% -0.00307 12.0% -0.0000498 0.195% 0.00116 -4.54%
2.5 -0.0184 -0.0163 88.5% -0.00315 17.1% -0.0000481 0.261% 0.00108 -5.86%
3 -0.0134 -0.0114 85.2% -0.00283 21.1% -0.0000411 0.307% 0.000890 -6.64%
Equilibrium solution at each level of trade costs using parameters in Table 1.1 and procedure in Appendix B.
Reduction of 10 log points in Tariff calculated using equation in Proposition 3.
At low trade costs, the decrease in the price index due to trade liberalization
is mainly explained by the direct effect, given that both domestic and foreign firms
have similar market shares. At high trade costs, the importance of the relative
concentration term increases, reaching 21% of the total effect when Tf = 3. The
highest economic significance is reached at Tf = 2.5 in this example, where the price
index increases 0.3 log points due to changes in large firms’ markups.47
1.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I argued that accounting for oligopolistic behavior in trade
flows is important given the high levels of concentration we observe in export data
and the evidence of an increase in domestic and foreign concentration observed in the
last couple of decades. I constructed a hybrid model where two types of firms, small
and large relative to the market, from two origins, domestic and foreign, compete
in a given market by selling varieties of the same good. Such model allowed me to
derive novel implications in which I relate industrial concentration to the CES price
47Note that there is almost no impact through entry. This is partially explained by the fact that
the bounded Pareto distribution is similar to the unbounded Pareto distribution when the cutoff
is far from the bound. Moreover, small firms only have between 20% and 30% of the market share
in this example as a result of being eight times less productive in average.
36
index at the industry level.
I uncovered a new channel through which trade liberalization can affect con-
sumer welfare: the relative industrial concentration between domestic and foreign
firms. When domestic firms are relatively more concentrated, a reduction in tar-
iffs has positive pro-competitive gains from trade because domestic granular firms
relatively reduce their markup. The opposite is true when foreign firms are rela-
tively more concentrated. The reason is that domestic concentration captures the
aggregate partial elasticity of the domestic price index to competition, and foreign
concentration in the domestic economy captures the aggregate partial elasticity of
the import price index to competition. In this regard, concentration is microfounded
by the state of competition through the distribution of markups. I show that this
effect is especially strong when countries are highly integrated and the share of
granular firms in the industry is large.
The model allowed me to construct a structural equation relating changes in
domestic concentration to changes in competition. I showed that when there is
a decrease in the industry price index (e.g. an increase in foreign competition),
domestic concentration increases as measured by the HHI if large domestic firms
have a larger market share than small domestic firms. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first theoretical equation relating concentration to international trade
that can be brought to the data.
The main limitation of the model is that it does not provide an explanation
nor a mechanism for the existence of large firms. In the case of small firms, a contin-
uum of potential entrants decide to enter depending on their expected productivity,
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business conditions and the sunk cost of entry. On the contrary, an exogenous num-
ber of origin-specific large firms is assumed to be present. Even though the lack
of entry with heterogeneous large firms is a limitation inherited from the oligopoly
literature, accounting for the mechanism through which these large firms come to
existence is important for future research.
In this chapter I focused on the impact of trade liberalization on both domestic
welfare and concentration, but this model can be employed to study the relation-
ship between domestic concentration and exports too. Generally, exporters are the
most productive domestic firms. Therefore, changes in domestic concentration can
be related to changes in their technologies due to investments made to enter foreign
markets. Moreover, the difference between their domestic and export concentration
can embed meaningful information about the relative state of competition across
foreign import markets. I leave studying the relationship between exports and con-
centration for future work.
Finally, the model can be used to understand the potential relationship be-
tween the increase in import penetration from China and the increase in domestic
concentration many countries have experienced. In light of the model, an increase
in the productivity of Chinese firms would increase the competitive pressure firms in
other countries face, causing large firms to decrease their prices and the less produc-
tive small firms to exit, increasing concentration. Even though there may be other
causes behind the observed increase in concentration in countries such as the US,
this model could be used to study different counterfactual scenarios and quantify
the relationship between concentration and foreign competition.
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Chapter 2: The Gravity Equation under Oligopolistic Behavior
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I explore the empirical implications of the hybrid model and
the role of exporter concentration for the structural relation between bilateral trade
flows and its determinants, the so-called gravity equation. The gravity equation
has been labeled as “one of the most empirically successful in economics” due to
its high explanatory and predicting power of trade flows with observable data (cf.
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Even though it was first used as an empirical
relationship, many papers have developed its micro-foundations in the context of
perfect and monopolistically competitive markets. I extend this framework to ac-
count for oligopolistic behavior in the context of increasing exporter concentration
and integration of recent years.
I exploit the hybrid structure of the model developed in Chapter 1 to derive a
novel augmented gravity equation in changes. I show that the first-order impact of
a change in tariffs on trade flows is lower when exporter-specific granular firms are
more concentrated and have a larger market share in the importing country. This
finding makes explicit that the structural gravity equations derived from monopo-
listic competitive models are misspecified when there is oligopolistic behavior.
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The model allows me to empirically study the heterogeneous first-order impact
of trade policy through the differential market power of large firms. I study recent
changes in Colombia’s trade policy that differentially affected exporting countries
within industries. In the 2010-2013 period, Colombia decreased its Most Favored
Nation (MFN) tariffs and signed its first Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with devel-
oped countries.1 I exploit industry and country variation arising from that differ-
ential treatment to identify both the average elasticity of imports with respect to
trade costs, i.e. the trade elasticity, and the oligopolistic margin, the extra chan-
nel introduced by granular firms. Using the theory-based industrial concentration
measure that captures the differential pass-through across exporters, I find that
the oligopolistic margin effectively reduced the magnitude of the trade elasticity.
In the preferred specification, one standard deviation increase in the theory-based
concentration measure reduces the trade elasticity by 55%.
The newly identified oligopolistic margin suggests that the actual impact of
tariffs on imports is highly heterogeneous across exporters and depends on their
initial concentration. I find that predicted import growth is significantly lower than
under monopolistic competition for the top 19% import flows in terms of concentra-
tion. Moreover, I find that the aggregate effect is higher than the average effect due
to the oligopolistic margin, illustrating that this channel can have important impli-
cations for aggregate trade. In terms of trade policy, oligopolistic behavior can also
have implications for the effect of preferential treatment across exporters. I estimate
that imports from countries at the top decile of firm concentration have 13 log point
1Canada (2011), US (2012), and the European Union (2013).
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lower average growth than imports from countries at the bottom decile over a period
of time in which imports grew 36 log points on average. Therefore, policymakers
should consider the market structure of foreign exporters when proposing changes
to trade policy.
The industry model developed in Chapter 1 can be understood as a modifica-
tion of Chaney (2008), where heterogeneous firms from different countries decide to
enter into foreign markets based on a fixed cost of exporting and variable profits.
In his setting, the trade elasticity has two margins: the intensive margin, which
captures changes in firms’ prices, and the extensive margin, which captures firm
entry and thus an increase in varieties. In the hybrid model, the inclusion of origin-
specific granular firms introduces an extra margin to the trade elasticity due to their
oligopolistic behavior. The new margin reduces the trade elasticity by capturing how
firms absorb part of changes in trade costs and tariffs through changes in markups.
I show that this oligopolistic margin depends on the importance of the affected large
firms within a given market and a measure of their concentration.2 This result is
intuitive: bilateral flows will react less to changes in trade costs if firms that are
able to change their markups have a preponderant role. In conclusion, the trade
elasticity is variable and initial concentration matters when there is oligopolistic
behavior.
I contribute to the understanding of the gravity equation in the context of
structural models. Anderson (1979) was the first to propose a theoretical framing of
2The model nests Chaney (2008), and therefore when the market share of these firms is zero
and the productivity distribution is unbounded we return to his model.
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the gravity equation. However, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) were the first to
provide a general equilibrium model to recover fundamental parameters. Recently,
many papers followed their approach and found settings under which a broad spec-
trum of general equilibrium models can microfound the gravity equation (cf. Arko-
lakis et al., 2012, Arkolakis et al., 2018, Allen et al., 2020). My model abstracts
from general equilibrium effects to focus on industry characteristics, which allows
me to study the impact of market structure at the level at which tariffs are usually
determined. Even though introducing oligopolistic behavior prevents me from find-
ing exact changes, the first order impact of trade costs allows me to characterize the
way oligopolistic behavior affects bilateral trade around the equilibrium.
There is an extensive empirical literature employing gravity equations to study
the impact of trade policy on bilateral trade. Some papers study the econometric
issues that arise when studying the impact of policy, such as Baier and Bergstrand
(2007); whereas other papers focus on the channels through which policy affects
different trade margins, such as Baier et al. (2014). I argue that the diff-in-diff
empirical strategy used in this chapter provides exogenous variation that overcomes
the regular issues of studying endogenous trade policy and allows me to identify the
aforementioned oligopolistic margin.
I show that the heterogeneous feature of granular firms across origin countries
gives exporter-specific industrial concentration an important role due to differences
in firms’ markups responses. In this regard, Edmond et al. (2018) decompose
the welfare costs of markups in an aggregate markup, misallocation and low entry
term, three channels that are present for each exporting country in my setting.
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Given that I focus on the role of concentration, I do a different decomposition of
the theoretical industrial concentration and identify three terms that are relevant
for the first order impact of tariffs on trade flows and can be constructed with
firm-level data: aggregate market power, conditional concentration, and granular
extensive margin. The first one captures the relative importance of an exporting
country, conditional on the distribution of market shares. A higher overall market
share implies more market power, given such distribution. The second one captures
market power arising from firm dispersion. In this sense, more dispersion implies a
higher first-order response of markups and therefore a stronger effect on prices. The
last one identifies variation from the number of large firms, which also increase the
relative market power of exporting countries. Given that the oligopolistic margin
depends on concentration, I decompose it into these three channels and find evidence
for them.
In Section 2, I derive the oligopoly-augmented gravity equation using the
model. In Section 3, I describe the empirical strategy and provide regression evi-
dence for the oligopolistic margin. In Section 4, I argue that the hybrid model is
especially important under high exporting firm concentration, and I quantitatively
show that policymakers should consider the heterogeneous first order response of
bilateral flows when setting tariffs. Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 An Oligopoly-Augmented Gravity Equation
In this section, I employ the model developed in Chapter 1 to derive a gravity
equation in changes. To do so, I generalize the model to having an arbitrary number
of exporters, which are indexed by c.
In the standard international trade model of heterogeneous firms with monop-
olistic competition, the relation between the change in trade flows, trade costs and
multilateral resistance terms takes the following form:3
d logMMCcd = −θMCd log Tcd + δGc + δGd (2.1)
where Mcd are d imports from c, Tcd are ad-valorem trade costs, θ
MC is the
trade elasticity and δGc and δ
G
c are destination and origin multilateral resistance
terms that capture c supply capabilities and d market potential.
The trade elasticity θMC captures both the extensive and intensive margin
effects of changes in trade costs. As shown by Chaney (2008), if we assume homo-
geneous firms acting under monopolistic competition, the trade elasticity is simply
σ − 1 as in Krugman (1980). However, If there are heterogeneous firms whose pro-
ductivity distribution follows an unbounded Pareto with shape parameter k, there is
also an extensive margin elasticity that is equal to k− (σ− 1). This means that the
trade elasticity is k (the sum of the intensive and the extensive margin elasticities).
3In order to directly compare to Chaney (2008), in this section I consider trade costs faced by
producers. Differently, tariffs are defined as the difference between the consumer and the producer
price. Conclusions do not differ when using tariffs and the only difference is a fixed factor modifying
the standard trade elasticity.
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Given the regularity condition k > (σ − 1), the elasticity under firm heterogeneity
is higher, reflecting the fact that decreasing trade costs not only decrease the price
of existing varieties but also induce entry of new varieties.
A key assumption of these models is that firms do not act strategically when
setting prices or quantities. Given that the industry model I consider includes firms
that do act strategically, we also need to account for changes in c’s market power
at d. Not accounting for it in the presence of oligopolistic behavior will lead to a
misspecification of the gravity equation in changes. The hybrid model provides an
interpretation of the structural change in the trade elasticity that occurs when we
do not include such change in market power. This is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 Oligopoly-Augmented Gravity Equation and Partial Trade
Elasticity. In the hybrid model with oligopolistic competition the gravity equation
in changes is:
d logMHCcd = −θHCcd d log Tcd + δHcd, (2.2)
where the partial trade elasticity is:
θHCcd = (σ − 1)[1 + (1− hlcd)Λscd − hlcdΨlcd], (2.3)
and δHcd captures the change in multilateral resistance terms.
4
4In this model, the multilateral resistance terms need to account for the imperfect pass-through
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Proof: See Appendix A.2.5.
This expression shows that by including granular firms, the impact of trade
costs has an extra margin, hlcdΨ
l
cd, relative to a setting with monopolistic competi-
tion. In addition, note that θHCcd is equal to k when there are no large firms, and the
productivity distribution is unbounded as in Chaney (2008).5 Moreover, (σ− 1)Λscd
is the hazard function identified by Melitz and Redding (2015) and it is related to
the marginal gain of adding an extra small firm. When there are few small for-
eign firms selling in the market, the trade elasticity increases because the marginal
welfare gain is high.6
The novel object included in the trade elasticity is the last term, which I call
the oligopolistic margin. This margin depends on two variables: the share of large





cd is lower than one, the inclusion of oligopolistic firms makes trade flows
less elastic to changes in trade costs but does not reverse the sign of their effect. The
intuition is simple: large firms absorb changes in trade costs by modifying markups.
The more important in terms of overall market shares and the more concentrated
they are, the more they are able to do so.7
due to markups and bounded Pareto: δHcd ≡ (1− hlcd)d logNcd +
[
1 + (1− hlcd)Λscd
]
d logEp + (σ −
1)
[
1 + (1− hlcd)Λscd − hlcdΨlcd
]
d logP .
5The elasticity of imports with respect to tariffs is slightly different, given that tariffs are not
paid by producers:






6Even though the marginal gain of new varieties decreases as more firms enter, it is always
positive. In Feenstra and Weinstein (2017), the translog preferences add an extra term with a
negative effect that they interpreted as crowding of the variety space.
7Fernandes et al. (2019) show that the intensive margin elasticity is increasing in firm size,
which may seem to contradict that larger firms react less to changes in trade policy given that
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2.3 Empirical Application
In this section, I apply the model to changes in trade policy in Colombia over
the 2010-2013 period which led to the differential treatment of a set of countries. In
this regard, I explicitly show the required identifying assumptions for obtaining the
empirical equation.
2.3.1 Institutional Setting
I exploit a country-level change in the preferential treatment of exporters to
Colombia from two types of events. First, Colombia implemented a unilateral trade
liberalization (UTL) in 2010. The Colombian government argued that the country
had a large inefficient dispersion in tariffs (cf. Torres and Romero, 2013). Next,
Colombia signed significant Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) over the 2011-2013 pe-
riod with Canada (2011), the US (2012), and the European Union (2013).
The UTL was a reform that covered most of the product spectrum. Exporting
countries that faced this reduction were those receiving Most Favored Nation (MFN)
status.8 This reform was effective in decreasing average tariffs in approximately 5.8%
from 2010 to 201.
Before 2010, Colombia only had agreements granting preferential access to
they modify their markups. However, their definition of the intensive margin elasticity refers to
how much of bilateral trade can be explained by exports per firm at different percentiles. In this
sense, my model assumes that the number of large firms and the share they explain can freely vary
across bilateral flows, and therefore cannot be related to their setting.
8Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC) were not reached by this reform given that
most of them have multiple preferential schemes in place. I exclude all LAC countries from the
analysis.
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most Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, but none to countries from
the rest of world.9 Therefore, any firm from countries outside LAC faced the MFN
tariffs to sell in Colombia.1011 This changed at the beginning of the 2010 decade
since Colombia signed FTAs with countries outside LAC that had a significant share
of Colombian imports. In 2011, the Canada FTA entered into force, an agreement
that represented 1% of total imports.12 In 2012, the agreement with the US was
put into force when the US Congress approved the bill after more than five years of
negotiation. Imports from the US were 27% in 2010. Finally, the agreement with
EU entered into force in 2013 and it represented 14% of Colombian imports in 2010.
In sum, Colombia put into force FTAs with countries that represented 42% of its
total imports. All these countries had MFN status before these agreements and
would have faced the post-UTL tariffs were not they had the FTA. In comparison,
non-LAC countries that were included in the UTL and did not end up having an
agreement with Colombia represented 23% of total imports.
9These regional agreements are the Andean Community with Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia
(founded in 1969), the ALADI with all South American countries and Mexico (1980), and with
CARICOM (1994). In 2009 Colombia signed a Free Trade Agreement with Chile and the Northern
Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador).
10I only consider countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in this
analysis.
11Colombian firms did have preferential access to developed countries such as the US and EU in
subsets of products as part of the non-reciprocal tariffs schemes these countries offer to developing
countries.
12In 2011 the agreement with EFTA countries entered into forced too. However, it was immedi-





In order to conduct the analysis, I employ the subset of exporters that benefited
from the UTL or signed an FTA with Colombia. Therefore I have two types of
exporters that initially faced the same MFN tariff: those that ended up having
FTAs and those that did not. For the reasons mentioned above, I do not include in
the sample LAC countries, and neither do I include countries that got preferential
status after 2013 to avoid heterogeneity in terms of the timing of the application.13
2.3.2.2 Empirical Equation
I employ the gravity equation presented in the previous section to estimate
whether exporter-products with a relatively high concentration measure Ψ have a
lower elasticity. To do so, I expand equation 2.2 and interpret it as a first-order
approximation around an initial equilibrium:14
∆ logMcp = [1 + (1− hlcp,t−1)Λscp,t−1]∆ logEp −
− (σ − 1)[1 + (1− hlcp,t−1)
σ
σ − 1
Λscp,t−1 − hlcp,t−1Ψcp,t−1]∆ log τcp +
+ (σ − 1)[1 + (1− hlcp,t−1)Λscp,t−1 − hlcp,t−1Ψcp,t−1]
[
∆ logPp −
13These are with EFTA (fully in force in 2015) and Korea (2016).
14I also include tariffs which were excluded for exposition in the previous section. Details of the
derivation in Appendix A.2.5.
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− ∆ log Tcp −∆ logwc
]
+ (1− hlcp,t−1)∆ logN scp + vip (2.4)
where p indexes a products (HS at 6 digits level), Tcp is the ad-valorem
exporter-product specific transport costs, τcp is the ad-valorem effectively applied
tariff, Ep is expenditure on p, wc are production costs in c, N
s
cp is the measure of
potential small entrants, and vcp is a mean zero approximation error.
15 Differences
are taken with respect to t − 1 which means that the initial market structure will
determine how each flow reacts.
2.3.2.3 Identifying Assumptions
Including the exporter and product fixed effects implies that I use diff-in-diff
variation to identify the effect. In this section I formally outline the identifying
assumptions:
A1. Constant deep parameters σ and k across exporters, products and time; sta-
tionary Λscp = Λ
s and hlcp = h
l.
A2. Exogenous exporter-specific production costs wc relative to tariffs.
A3. Elasticity of substitution across products equal to one.
A4. Potential entrants are determined by a product-specific, exporter-specific and






cp, with E(log ζ
s) = 0.
Assumption A1 implies that variation across products does not come from
different parameters but rather from different initial market structures and tariffs.
15Note that in Chapter 1 I used the term Tf to account for both Tcp and wc.
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This is a standard assumption in the literature. The stationary feature of Λs implies
that the entry cutoff is sufficiently far from the upper productivity bound. In fact,
being sufficiently far from that parameter implies that Λ tends to k
σ−1−1. Assuming
an homogeneous hl implies that actual variation in this variable will be captured by
concentration. I show that this variable one or very close to one in most cases and
test this restriction in the regression section.
Assumption A2 is done to focus on industry variables and avoid general equilib-
rium effects. Given the product level of aggregation I am employing, this assumption
is reasonable (the HS at 6-digits includes approximately 5000 categories). Moreover,
I am not including countries that are in the same region for which Colombia is po-
tentially an important export destination.
Assumption A3 holds if the HS6 classification is identifying products that are
not sufficiently close in the product spectrum. The functional form of the oligopolis-
tic margin and therefore the augmented gravity equation depends on this assump-
tion. However, this assumption is more likely to not hold when a single firm is
close to being a monopolist within a product across all exporters. In that case, the
competition the firm cares about is the one between products rather than within
the same product.
In order to derive the empirical equation under the previous assumptions, note
that the concentration measure affects all variables determining prices, including the
price index P . This means that simply including fixed effects to control for changes
in P and production costs will not be enough to account for the entire impact of the
oligopolistic behavior. Therefore, we also need to allow for product and exporter-
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specific slopes relative to Ψ. Note that estimating the standard gravity equation in
the presence of strategic behavior implies that the equation is misspecified because
the original gravity equation omits the interaction between tariffs and initial mar-
ket power. As a result, standard trade elasticity estimates are biased if there are
oligopolistic firms.
Under the assumptions A1-A4, we get:
∆ logMcp = α
MC
τ ∆ log τcp + α
OCΨcp,t−1∆ log τcp +
+ αMCT ∆ log Tcp + α
OCΨcp,t−1∆ log Tcp +
+ [δIp + δ
S
p Ψcp,t−1]





αMCτ = (1− σ)[1 + (1− hl) σσ−1Λ
s] < 0
αMCT = (1− σ)[1 + (1− hl)Λs] < 0
αOC = −hl(1− σ) > 0
δIp = (σ − 1)[1 + (1− hl)Λs∆ logPp + [1 + (1− hl)Λs]∆ logEp + (1− hl)∆ logNp
δSp = (σ − 1)hl∆ logPp
δIc = (1− σ)[1 + (1− hl)Λs]∆ logwc + (1− hl)∆ logNc
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δSc = −hl(1− σ)∆ logwc
ucp = (1− hl)∆ log ζscp + vcp
where note that E(ucp) = 0.
16
To conclude the section, I explicitly show the variation I am using under this
specification. For simplicity, let’s define variables as differences with respect to the
product average change as ∆ log M̃cp,t = ∆ logMcp,t −∆ logM.p,t.
∆ log M̃FTAcp,t −∆ log M̃MFNc′p,t ≡ α
MC
τ [∆ log τ̃
FTA
cp −∆ ˜log τMFNc′p ]−
− αOCΨFTAcp [∆ log τ̃FTAcp −∆ log τ̃MFNc′p ]−
− αOC∆ log τ̃MFNcp [ΨFTAcp −ΨMFNc′p ] (2.6)
The first term in equation 2.6 shows the variation that we would interpret to
be capturing if we assume the standard monopolistic model. This implies a constant
elasticity and therefore the pass-through is constant. The second term captures how
much of the extra decrease in tariffs to FTA countries is related to an increase in
markups. As a consequence, it has the opposite sign of the first term.
The last term captures initial differences in concentration that would cause a
differential effect of a change in tariffs for FTA countries relative to UTL. The sign
of this term depends on which set of countries is relatively more concentrated. If
16Some papers suggest that the level of concentration can influence the change in tariffs over a
period of trade liberalization (e.g. Ferreira and Facchini, 2005). Note that if this is the case, the
specification in equation 2.5 controls for that possibility as long as the initial level of concentration
captures the relevant information for future changes in tariffs.
53
UTL countries are so, then this term is positive because the decrease in tariffs will
cause the relative markups of UTL firms to increase and thus part of the demand
is reallocated towards FTA countries, increasing their exports. This is the key term
capturing how heterogeneous the first-order impact of tariffs can be when we have
a uniform change in tariffs.
2.3.3 Descriptive Section
In this section I describe the data I employ for the empirical analysis and
descriptive statistics.
2.3.3.1 Data
The main source of information is customs data from DANE (National Ad-
ministrative Department of Statistics by its Spanish acronym) that covers imports
from 2004 to 2018. This information is detailed since it includes all transactions
recorded in administrative custom data between Colombian and foreign firms. The
most relevant information it includes for this analysis are total imports in CIF and
FOB terms, quantity, weight, HS10 digits product category, an importer identifier,
the exporting country, the city and country of the seller, and the effectively ap-
plied tariff. This detailed data helps me to construct import data aggregated to
product-exporter-year to line it up with the theoretical predictions.
Given that I do not exactly observe the foreign exporter identifier, I construct
a proxy by employing information about foreign firms included in the database. To
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validate this information I employ the Export Dynamic Database (EDD) which pro-
vides the number of firms and other firm-based information for a subset of exporters
disaggregated by importer and HS2 product levels.
I also employ the Annual Manufacturing Survey (EAM is its Spanish acronym)
also collected by DANE to do robustness checks related to the definition of market
shares. This data is an annual survey of all the manufacturing establishments with
more than 10 employees. The database is at the establishment level and it includes
the total valor of production, value added, employees, among other information.17
Finally, I also employed information from the WTO and Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) to classify exporters based on their type of agreement it has with Colombia.
2.3.3.2 UTL and FTA Applied Tariffs and Aggregate Colombian Im-
ports.
We can observe the UTL and FTA change in trade policy by using the ef-
fectively applied tariff included in the DANE import data. Under the UTL, all
countries faced the same decrease in tariffs for each product. In addition, those
with an FTA with Colombia had an extra decrease that was negotiated in each
specific agreement.
In Figure 2.1 we can observe that both UTL and FTA countries faced a sig-
17Establishments are classified by the Colombian version of the ISIC Rev 3 and Rev 4 classifi-
cation, depending the year. I match this information to the import data at the HS 6-digit level by
bringing the EAM data to the international version of the ISIC Rev 3 classification. Given that
ISIC is a 4-digit industry classification that is more aggregated that the HS 6-digits classification
I assumed that all the HS 6-digits products within a ISIC 4-digit industry had the same import
penetration ratio.
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Figure 2.1: Average log Change in Tariffs Faced by UTL and FTA Exporters and
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t + δcp + εcpt where log τ
r
cpt is the effectively ad-valorem tariff paid by exporter
c in 6-digits HS product p, where r could be the UTL and FTA regime, and δcp is a exporter-HS6 product level







t 1{c ∈ FTA}+ δcp + εcpt. Both regressions weighted by imports at the cpt
level. Robust standard errors.
nificant decrease in average tariffs, which difference was significant after 2014.
In order to establish a benchmark for the analysis, I employ the 2007-2017
time period. First, I use 2007 to avoid using the 2008-2010 period in which global
trade collapsed due to the Great Recession. As mentioned, this global crisis was
the trigger for the 2010 UTL in Colombia. Moreover, FTA negotiations usually
take years. Therefore, using a year that is not close to the entry into force of such
agreements has the advantage that firms probably did not anticipate the future
agreement. Second, I use 2017 because it is at a reasonable distance from the last
considered agreement that entered into force (EU in 2013). Given that I study
the effect through prices, and tariffs progressively decline under FTAs, using the
first year (i.e. 2014) after the agreements may not provide the additional variation
56
required for the analysis. This can be seen in Figure 2.1 as tariffs continued declining
for FTA countries. I do robustness checks by using alternative time periods.
2.3.3.3 Firm Proxy
The import database provided by DANE does not include an identifier nor a
name for the foreign firm exporting to Colombia. Given that capturing firm level
decisions is important for this paper since it directly links to aggregate trade flows
elasticities and flows, I construct a firm identifier from the available information in
the data. I argue that the city and country of the seller can be exploited with that
goal. The location of this firm can differ from the country in which production takes
place. Therefore, gravity forces act as usual but I can use the extra information from
the firm location to proxy for firms (i.e. trade costs are determined by the exporting
and importing country since the goods have to physically be moved between these
two countries, and production costs are determined by the supplier access of such
exporter). The assumption is that the seller is the price-setter, not the producer.
In order to validate this proxy, I use the EDD which includes the number of
firms and concentration measures such as the HHI and the share of top firms for
each exporter-importer-HS2-year for all exporter-years included in the sample. The
proxy firm indicator delivers high correlation between the DANE data and the EDD.
Further details in Appendix C.
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2.3.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
In order to contextualize the regression results, I summarize the main variables
in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics. Baseline Sample (2007-2017).
All FTA UTL
Average s.d. Average s.d. Average s.d.
∆ logM 0.357 2.421 0.209 2.347 0.607 2.522
∆ log τ -0.066 0.045 -0.071 0.046 -0.058 0.041
∆ log T -0.028 0.123 -0.023 0.122 -0.037 0.125
Share of Top 4 Firms (t-1) 0.930 0.134 0.935 0.128 0.922 0.145
Ψt−1 (Top 4 Firms) 0.086 0.151 0.088 0.156 0.083 0.144
HHIt−1 (Top 4 Firms) 0.642 0.273 0.645 0.270 0.637 0.277
HHIt−1 0.604 0.314 0.608 0.309 0.596 0.321
N 26,142 16,422 9,720
Variables in changes calculated for the 2007-2017 period. Variables evaluated at t− 1 correspond to 2007. Top and
bottom 0.01% of variables in changes not considered.
The first salient result is that imports from UTL countries increased signifi-
cantly more. In fact, the average growth rate is almost three times bigger for these
countries. It is worth noting that China is included in this sample and imports from
this country increased more than three times over the 2007-2017 period. However,
not including China does not change the fact that UTL countries grew more. One
potential factor explaining it may be the higher decrease in transport costs mea-
sured by the difference between CIF and FOB import valuation. In the table this
is shown by ∆ log T , where T is calculated as an ad-valorem trade cost. I use this
measure in the regression analysis as a control.
The average extra decrease in the effectively applied tariffs for FTA countries
was 1.3 percentage points. However, average transport cost decrease 1.5 percentage
points more in the case of UTL. The model predicts that the relative increase in
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tariffs could have been neutralized by the opposite change in transport costs. Hence,
this could help to explain why UTL countries grew more.
In terms of the relative market power, the unobserved behavior of firms implies
that I have to assume which firms behave as large and which as small. In that regard,
I define as granular firms the top four within an exporter-product.18 Therefore, I
construct the Ψ for the top four firms and assume that σ = 4, a value that is centered
within the range of what other papers have estimated.
Using the Ψ constructed as explained, we can see that FTA countries had
a lower pass-through overall, with an absorption of 0.088 versus 0.083 for UTL
countries. This could also have helped UTL countries to increase their relative
exports to Colombia. As it can be seen in equation 2.6, when ΨFTA > ΨUTL, the
impact of a decrease in UTL tariffs is to increase UTL countries’ exports relative to
those from FTA countries.
Note that the HHI and the share of top four firms give mixed evidence on
which set of countries was initially more concentrated. In addition, note that the
average share of top firms is 0.95, which shows the high granularity of the data at
the exporter-product level. In fact, if we assume that this variable is a proxy for
the share of granular firms, hlcp, we would conclude that about 40% of the exporter-
products have four or less firms selling to Colombia and about 75% of them would
have more than 90% of sales concentrated in the top four firms.
18The share of top four firms is another widely used measure of concentration. For instance,





The theory predicts that changes in tariffs will be partially absorbed by the
industry structure of the affected exporter under A1-A4 assumptions. Without
assuming oligopolistic behavior, we would estimate the effect of tariffs without con-
sidering the initial concentration. In column 1 of Table 2.2 I estimate this equation.
The elasticity of imports with respect to tariffs is negative and significant as pre-
dicted by the theory and its magnitude is in line with the literature.
Table 2.2: Baseline Results. Monopolistic Competition and Hybrid Competition.
MC model Hybrid Model Hybrid Model
(1) (2) (3)
∆ log τcp -5.294*** -4.690*** -4.064***
(0.815) (0.959) (0.902)
∆ log τcp ×Ψcp,t−1 2.254**
(1.119)
∆ log Tcp -2.788*** -2.394*** -2.474***
(0.222) (0.232) (0.261)
∆ log Tcp ×Ψcp,t−1 -0.206
(0.336)
Exporter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
HS6 Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-specific Ψ Slopes No Yes Yes
HS6-specific Ψ Slopes No Yes Yes
Observations 26,142 26,142 26,142
R-squared 0.272 0.427 0.428
Adjusted R-squared 0.166 0.230 0.231
Restriction p-value hˆl = 1 ((σ − 1)hl = 3) - - 0.109
Restriction p-value hˆl = 0.9 ((σ − 1)hl = 2.7) - - 0.10
OLS Regressions. Variables in changes calculated for the 2007-2017 period. Variables evaluated at t− 1
correspond to 2007. Top and bottom 0.01% of variables in changes not considered. Standardized Ψ. MC model:
Exporter and HS6 fixed effects. Hybrid model: MC model fixed effects plus exporter and HS6-specific slopes
relative to Ψ. Standard errors clustered at HS2-type of Colombian policy treatment FTA-MFN status (354
clusters). Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
However, the granular feature of exporters suggests that firms may have ex-
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ploited their size to rise markups. In column 2, I interact the product and exporter
fixed effects by industrial concentration as defined by the model in order to have a
benchmark for the baseline result. In this case, the tariff elasticity is influenced by
the underlying distribution of Ψ. Note that both the R2 and adjusted R2 increase
by about 50%, showing that the hybrid model has more explanatory power.
Column 3 presents the baseline results where I also interact tariffs and trans-
port costs by a demeaned Ψ. The elasticity of imports with respect to tariffs at the
mean Ψ is −4.064, whereas an increase of one standard deviation of this variable de-
creases the elasticity by 55%. This shows that the oligopolistic margin has a strong
influence on the trade elasticity.
In terms of the effect of transport costs on imports, the impact at the mean is
significant and the elasticity is −2.474. However, the interaction with the standard-
ized Ψ is insignificant. Given that there can be other factors affecting this variable
and it may be observed with measurement error, I will focus on analyzing the tariff
elasticity henceforth.1920
Assumption A1 imposes hl to be constant across countries. Three quarters of
the flows have a share of top four firms that is higher than 90%. Therefore, I test
whether this variable can be assumed to be constant using the baseline specification.
Given that I assume that σ = 4 when constructing Ψ I test the restriction ˆαOC =
3 ∗ hl. I cannot reject the null hypothesis of hl = 1 and hl = 0.9, which means that
19A potential source of measurement error may be its aggregation. I aggregate this variable
by taking the simple average across transactions within each exporter-product after eliminating
outliers. Other ways of aggregating this variable yield similar results.
20As long as tariffs are not correlated with export-product specific transport costs, the tariff
coefficient is unbiased.
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there is no evidence of a misspecified restriction.
2.3.4.2 Robustness
In order to construct Ψ I had to assume which firms I treat as large. Therefore,
I use different definitions of Ψ to assure that there is nothing specific about the way
I am construction the variable. In Table 2.3 I include all the different definitions of
Ψ I employ.
Table 2.3: Robustness: Concentration Measure Definition.











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log τcp -4.064*** -4.137*** -3.448*** -4.274*** -4.214*** -3.877***
(0.898) (0.909) (0.962) (0.896) (0.946) (0.897)
∆ log τcp ×Ψcp,t−1 2.294** 1.929* 3.135** 1.766 2.374** 3.012**
(1.113) (1.091) (1.442) (1.081) (1.136) (1.303)
∆ log Tcp -2.489*** -2.450*** -2.409*** -2.459*** -2.300*** -2.466***
(0.261) (0.258) (0.270) (0.256) (0.249) (0.264)
∆ log Tcp ×Ψcp,t−1 -0.226 -0.204 0.032 -0.147 0.281 -0.176
(0.331) (0.337) (0.352) (0.320) (0.276) (0.361)
Observations 26,142 26,142 24,486 26,142 25,299 26,142
R-squared 0.425 0.433 0.414 0.423 0.422 0.418
Mean Ψ 0.101 0.0807 0.0501 0.0825 0.0708 0.0563
s.d. of Ψ 0.172 0.146 0.106 0.151 0.146 0.104
OLS Regressions. Variables in changes calculated for the 2007-2017 period. Variables evaluated at t− 1
correspond to 2007. Top and bottom 0.01% of variables in changes not considered. Standardized Ψ. Column 1: Ψ
calculated using the top firm within the exporter-product. Column 2: Ψ calculated using the top 20 firms within
the exporter-product. Column 3: Ψ calculated using the top 4 firms, including the imputed share of domestic
firms. Column 4: Ψ calculated only for firms exceeding the > 1% in terms of overall market share (i.e. considering
all origins). Column 5: Ψ constructed by using the HS6 level median σ from Broda and Weinstein (2006). Column
6: Constructing Ψ by simple averaging across firms rather than using the weighted average. Exporter and HS6
fixed effects and exporter and HS6-specific slopes relative to Ψ included. Standard errors clustered at HS2-type of
Colombian policy treatment FTA-MFN status (354 clusters). Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
Columns 1 and 2 use the top firm and top twenty firms to calculate Ψ. As
expected, none of them substantially change the baseline conclusions. When I use
the top firm I get a similar coefficient to the baseline, showing that the largest firm
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provides useful variation to identify the oligopolistic margin. Using the top twenty
firms marginally decreases the coefficient and makes it noisier. The decrease in its
magnitude and precision may suggest that using the top twenty firms may classify
small firm as large firms. In spite of this, it is statistically the same as the baseline
coefficient.
To construct Ψ, I use the firm-specific market share across all exporters. How-
ever, foreign exporters also compete with domestic firms. In column 3, I use the
market share of exporters taking into account also domestic sales imputed to those
products.21 In this case, both ˆαMC and ˆαOC increase. As a result, the impact of an
increase in a s.d. in Ψ is relatively high (90%).
Assuming that the top four firms behave oligopolistically across all exporters
and products can also be a strong assumption. As a result, I alternatively define
granular firms as those having more than 1% of total Colombia imports in that
product across all exporters. Column 4 shows that in this case, the oligopolistic
margin has the right sign and similar magnitude to the baseline but is marginally
insignificant.
Another assumption I make to construct Ψ is a fixed σ. As a robustness I use
the Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimation of elasticities of substitutions for the US
at the HS 10 digits level and take the median within each HS 6 digits level. Column
5 shows the results using this estimated parameters. Estimates are very similar to
the baseline.
21I employ the EAM to calculate domestic sales. However, the mismatch and different levels of
classifications between the domestic industry data and the custom product level data implies that
I am potentially introducing error into this measure.
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Another potential issue is capturing some sort of mechanical correlation when
taking the weighted average of the markup equilibrium responses. I rule this out by
taking the simple average. Column 6 shows that results are robust to this.
The assumption of having exporter-specific production costs may be strong
if different industries use inputs with different intensities. Therefore, I relax this
assumption by controlling for exporter-HS2 fixed effects. Columns 2 of Table 2.4
shows that the oligopolistic margin is robust to such control.
Table 2.4: Robustness: Alternative Specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ log τcp -4.064*** -4.197*** -5.569*** -6.136***
(0.902) (1.101) (0.974) (1.012)
∆ log τcp ×Ψcp,t−1 2.254** 3.992**
(1.119) (1.662)
∆ log τcp× High Ψcp,t−1 indicator 3.282* 2.480
(1.734) (1.687)
∆ log Tcp -2.474*** -2.155*** -2.511*** -2.485***
(0.261) (0.281) (0.230) (0.236)
∆ log Tcp ×Ψcp,t−1 -0.206 0.302
(0.336) (0.471)
∆ log Tcp× High Ψcp,t−1 indicator -0.179 0.164
(0.492) (0.543)
Exporter fixed effects and Ψ slopes Yes No No No
Exporter-HS2 fixed effects and Ψ slopes No Yes No No
HS6 fixed effects and Ψ slopes Yes Yes No No
Exporter-Top Ψ indicator fixed effects No No Yes No
Exporter-HS2-Top Ψ indicator fixed effects No No No Yes
HS6-Top Ψ indicator fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 26,142 25,596 24,703 23,640
R-squared 0.428 0.556 0.348 0.440
OLS Regressions. Variables in changes calculated for the 2007-2017 period. Variables evaluated at t− 1 correspond
to 2007. Top and bottom 0.01% of variables in changes not considered. Standardized Ψ. Exporter and HS6 fixed
effects and exporter and HS6-specific slopes relative to Ψ included. High Ψ indicator captures the top quartile of
the distribution of Ψt−1, where the 75th percentile is 0.095. Standard errors clustered at HS2-type of Colombian
policy treatment FTA-MFN status (354 clusters). Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Another potential issue may be the high number of interactions in which Ψ is
involved given that it could be inflating the coefficient of interest due to potentially
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high collinearity. To rule out such scenario I construct an indicator that takes the
value of one when the exporter-product flow is in the top quartile of the distribution
of Ψ.22 I use this statistic and not the median given that the distribution of Ψ is
positively skewed.23
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4 I interact the change in tariffs and all the
fixed effects by the indicator to capture the two potentially different levels of the
oligopolistic margin. In column 3 I use the baseline specification and find a positive
and significant effect. In column 4 I also interact the baseline fixed effects by HS2
products. The result is marginally insignificant but it has the same sign and magni-
tude. This shows that the magnitude of the baseline estimations are not explained
by potential collinearity.
Table 2.5: Robustness: Alternative Time Periods.
2006-2016 2007-2017 2008-2018
(1) (2) (3)
∆ log τcp -2.012*** -4.059*** -3.837***
(0.775) (0.903) (0.724)
∆ log τcp ×Ψcp,t−1 2.570*** 2.255** 2.684**
(0.909) (1.120) (1.198)
∆ log Tcp -2.479*** -2.474*** -2.297***
(0.244) (0.261) (0.310)
∆ log Tcp ×Ψcp,t−1 -0.317 -0.206 -0.045
(0.403) (0.336) (0.383)
Observations 24,416 26,142 26,473
R-squared 0.448 0.428 0.427
OLS Regressions. Variables in changes calculated for the period noted on the column header. Variables evaluated
at t− 1 correspond to the base period of the change. Top and bottom 0.01% of variables in changes not
considered. Standardized Ψ. Exporter and HS6 fixed effects and exporter and HS6-specific slopes relative to Ψ
included. Standard errors clustered at HS2-type of Colombian policy treatment FTA-MFN status (354 clusters).
Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
22The 75th percentile of the Ψ distribution is 0.095.
23The average Ψ for the three lower quartiles is 0.019 whereas in the case of the top quartile it
is 0.29. Its skewness is 2.7.
65
Another potential issue may be the chosen baseline period. In Table 2.5 I show
that I get similar estimates when I use the 2006-2016 and 2008-2018 time periods.
2.3.4.3 Endogenous Trends
Initial concentration as captured by Ψ can be correlated with import growth.
For instance, young firms can find more ground for growth in foreign markets in
relatively less concentrated and protected industries. As a result, the coefficients
can be capturing a different relationship not necessarily related to the oligopolistic
margin.
In this regard, finding a valid instrument would be the first best for addressing
such endogeneity. However, the theoretical model shows that we need to account
for all the different product and exporter-specific absorption caused by oligopolistic
behavior, which is the reason why I include the product and exporter-specific slopes.
This means that in the case of finding an instrument for Ψ we need to instrument
all the slopes as well. This is unfeasible given the number of interaction it implies.
I follow a different approach to deal with potential endogeneity. I assume that
product and exporter-specific import growth is linear over the 2004-2017 period
of time and stack two annualized differences, 2004-2007 and 2007-2017. Doing so
allows me to control for exporter-product fixed effects.
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Table 2.6: Deviations from Linear Trends. Monopolistic Competition and Hybrid
Competition.
MC model Hybrid model Hybrid model
(1) (2) (3)
∆ log τcpt -6.058*** -4.719*** -2.199*
(0.966) (1.069) (1.259)
∆ log τcpt ×Ψcp,t−1 5.816***
(2.053)
∆ log Tcpt -2.038*** -1.072*** -0.465
(0.263) (0.232) (0.359)
∆ log Tcpt ×Ψcp,t−1 1.219*
(0.680)
Observations 39,436 39,436 39,436
R-squared 0.568 0.782 0.783
OLS Regressions. Variables in changes stacked calculated and annualized for the 2007-2017 and 2004-2007 period.
Variables evaluated at t− 1 correspond to 2004 and 2007. Top and bottom 0.01% of variables in changes not
considered. Standardized Ψ. MC model: Exporter-year, HS6-year and exporter-HS6 fixed effects. Hybrid model:
MC model fixed effects plus exporter-year and HS6-year specific slopes relative to Ψ. Standard errors clustered at
HS2-type of Colombian policy treatment FTA-MFN status (354 clusters). Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In Table 2.6 I reproduce Table 2.2 with this specification. In column 1, I
show that both the tariff and transport cost elasticity we would get in the standard
specification are marginally higher although statistically the same as in Table 2.2.
In column 3 I confirm that the oligopolistic margin is not explained by differential
exporter-product linear trends. In addition, there is also evidence for the oligopolis-
tic margin in the transport cost elasticity, which may suggest that controlling for
these trends is especially relevant on a potentially endogenous variable.
2.3.4.4 Channels
The identified effect captures the total exporter-specific pass-through. How-
ever, I can decompose this variable to identify the different channels that play a role
in the first order impact of tariffs on imports due to oligopolistic behavior. Note
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that the measure Ψ is a function of large firms’ market share, slcp = scph
l
cp, and the
distribution of shares, {zcp,i}. Hence, we can decompose it as follows:
Ψ = ΨM + ΨC + ΨN (2.7)
where:
• ΨM ≡ Ψ(slcp, {zcp,i})−Ψ(1, {zcp,i}) accounts for the market power shifter,
• ΨC ≡ Ψ(1, {zcp,i}) − Ψ(1, 1/Ncp) accounts for the conditional firm concentra-
tion,
• ΨN ≡ Ψ(1, 1/Ncp) accounts for the granular extensive margin.
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Table 2.7: Oligopolistic Channels.
(1)
∆ log τcp -2.567**
(1.116)
∆ log τcp ×ΨM,cp,t−1 8.896***
(2.746)
∆ log τcp ×ΨC,cp,t−1 3.846**
(1.641)
∆ log τcp ×ΨN ,cp,t−1 8.533***
(2.763)
∆ log Tcp -2.090***
(0.374)
∆ log Tcp ×ΨM,cp,t−1 -0.509
(0.915)
∆ log Tcp ×ΨC,cp,t−1 -0.147
(0.501)










OLS Regressions. Variables in changes calculated for the 2007-2017 period. Variables evaluated at t− 1
correspond to 2007. Top and bottom 0.01% of variables in changes not considered. Standardized Ψ. Exporter and
HS6 fixed effects and exporter and HS6-specific slopes relative to all Ψ included. Standard errors clustered at
HS2-type of Colombian policy treatment FTA-MFN status (354 clusters). Statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In Table 2.7 I show the results when I interact the tariff and transport cost
change with the variables capturing the different oligopolistic channels. The three
channels are significant and imply a larger effect than in the baseline. A poten-
tial reason is multicollinearity given that the number of interactions significantly
increased due to the interactions with the exporter and product fixed effects. How-
ever, the sign and magnitudes are stable across alternative specifications, which
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indicates that they may be capturing the fundamental channels behind overall in-
dustrial concentration.
2.4 Quantitative Implications
In this section, I analyze the quantitative impact of the oligopolistic margin
through industrial concentration. First, I show that employing the hybrid model is
especially relevant in cases of high concentration. Second, I calculate the average
and aggregate effect of tariffs to show the aggregate importance of the oligopolistic
margin. Third, I focus on the differential concentration across countries to draw
policy implications.
2.4.1 Monopolistic Competitive Model vs. Hybrid Model
The trade elasticity is constant in the standard monopolistic competitive model
where firms are sizeless and their distribution follows an unbounded Pareto. On
the contrary, the trade elasticity can be potentially heterogeneous when there are
granular firms and their country-specific distribution of market shares differ. To
test if the hybrid model predictions differ from the standard model, I construct the
following:






∆ log τ (2.8)
This equation delivers a distribution of predicted import growth that depends
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on the underlying distribution of industrial concentration. In Figure 2.2, I include
both the distribution of Ψ and the differential predicted import growth at different
levels of Ψ and the average log tariff change (−0.066). Specifically, I put the differ-
ence between predicted import growth in the hybrid model and predicted growth in
the monopolistic model, in the y-axis, and initial concentration as measured by Ψ
in the x-axis.
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Relationship between the differential predicted import growth due to changes in tariffs using baseline estimates
from Table 2.2, Column 3 (monopolistically competitive model with no granular firms minus hybrid model with
granular firms). Calculations at average ∆ log τ = −0.066. Confidence intervals at 90%. Kernel density of Ψ
truncated at Ψ < 0.3 for clarity of exposition (the 91th percentile).
Figure 2.2 shows that at average Ψ̄ (0.086), both models yield the same pre-
dicted import growth. This is consistent with the extensive literature showing the
goodness of fit of the gravity equation since it suggests we could ignore this chan-
nel in some settings. When initial concentration is higher than 0.147, the hybrid
model delivers significantly lower import growth. In terms of the sample employed,
it means that for the top 19% exporter-industry import flows, the impact of trade
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liberalization will be lower than what a standard gravity equation microfounded by
perfect and monopolistic competitive models would estimate. In a context where
export concentration seems to be growing, considering the differential behavior of
large firms may become increasingly necessary.
2.4.2 Average and Aggregate Effect
In this section I calculate the partial average and aggregate effect of changes
in tariffs over the 2007-2017 period. In doing so, I separate the effect attributed
to the extensive and intensive margin, and the effect attributed to the oligopolistic
margin.
The average effect is calculated as follows:
∆ logMHC,ave = α̂HC,Iτ ∆ log τ + α̂
HC,S
τ Ψ∆ log τ (2.9)
where the first term captures the average intensive and extensive margin, and
the second term the average oligopolistic margin. In Table 2.8 I show that the
oligopolistic margin reduces predicted import growth by about 8 log points, which
is 24% less than what the intensive and extensive margins predict.
Table 2.8: Impact of Tariffs Reduction in the Hybrid Model (log points).
Intensive and
Extensive Margins
Oligopolistic Margin Total Effect
Average 35.5 -8.44 27.1
Aggregate 28.0 -18.1 9.91
Calculations made by using baseline results in Table 2.2, Column 3 using non-standardized coefficients.
To calculate the aggregate effect, I use initial exporter-product imports weights
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in 2007, ρcp =
Mcp,2007∑n
cp=1Mcp,2007
, where n is the number of included observations:
∆ logMHC,agg = α̂HC,Iτ
n∑
cp=1





ρcpΨcp∆ log τcp (2.10)
where the first term captures the aggregate intensive and extensive margin,
and the second term the aggregate oligopolistic margin. As shown in Table 2.8, the
aggregate total affect is a third part of the average effect. This difference is mostly
explained by the importance of the oligopolistic margin, which reduces the predicted
import growth by 18 log points in this case.
2.4.3 Differential Impact Due to Concentration
When tariffs uniformly decrease for all exporters, the model predicts that the
impact will be heterogeneous depending on the initial aggregate market power of
exporters. In this section I quantify the differential trade elasticity and import
growth between exporters with high and low concentration.
In Figure 2.3, I plot the relationship between product-specific industrial con-
centration in exports from China and the US to Colombia in 2007. The figure
shows that this variable has substantial variation as most dots are scattered along
the entire plane and do not seem to cluster around the 45 degree line.
In order to compare differences in industrial concentration, recall that the
change in imports can be written as follows based on the decomposition of the
oligopolistic margin presented in the previous section:
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Scatter plot of HS6-specific Ψp,CH (China) and Ψp,US (US) in 2007. The US has more market power in products
above the 45 degree line and China does in products below the 45 degree line.
∆̂ logM = ∆ log τp
[
α̂MC + α̂OC [ΨM + ΨC + ΨN ]
]
(2.11)
To isolate the heterogeneous impact of trade policy when there are differences
in the market structure of exporters, I calculate the product-specific differential
elasticity between high and low concentration exporters using the conditional con-
centration term ΨC. I calculate the elasticity of exporters at the 90th percentile of
ΨC (high concentration, HC) and the elasticity of exporters at the 10th percentile
of the same variable (low concentration, LC). In order to account for potential
correlation across the different components of Ψ and tariff changes, I also consider
the associated ΨM and ΨN , and changes in applied ∆ log τp of the high and low
concentration exporters.24
24Note that if HC countries have low ΨM and ΨN , the increase in the trade elasticity could be
offset.
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In Figure 2.4 I graph the empirical distribution of the differential import
growth between LC and HC exporters. As it can be seen, there is a lot of het-
erogeneity across products and the average differential is 13 log points. This implies
that the model predicts about 13% lower import growth in the case of exporters
that are highly concentrated.
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Distribution of ̂∆ logMHC − ̂∆ logMLC across HS6 products using baseline estimates from Table 2.2, Column 3.
In Table 2.9 I present detailed statistics of the distribution in Figure 2.4 along
with the distribution of trade elasticities. In Panel A I present product-level statis-
tics showing the average and range of the differential trade elasticity due to the
HC-LC country differences. The average trade elasticity differential due to firm
concentration is 1.962. In addition, there is substantial heterogeneity across prod-
ucts as it can be seen by the range and standard deviation.
The average elasticity considers also how ΨC relates to ΨM and ΨN . However,
we can isolate the impact of ΨC, which is shown in the third row of the same panel.
75
Table 2.9: High-Low Concentration Differential in Trade Elasticity and Predicted
Import Growth.
High-Low Concentration Differential Trade Elasticity
Panel A. All Products
Mean s.d. Min Max
Total 1.962 3.891 -13.861 14.741
Aggregate Market Power (M) 3.368 5.037 -14.502 14.902
Concentration (C) 3.527 1.734 0.000 7.431
Extensive Margin (N ) -4.934 3.067 -7.451 3.726
Panel B. Products with five or more exporters
Mean s.d. Min Max
Total 1.699 2.989 -8.069 14.029
Aggregate Market Power (M) 3.100 4.189 -10.413 14.538
Concentration (C) 4.189 1.335 0.352 7.431
Extensive Margin (N ) -5.589 2.670 -7.451 3.726
High-Low Concentration Differential Import Growth
Panel C. All Products
Mean s.d. Min Max
Total -0.129 0.343 -2.354 1.751
Aggregate Market Power (M) -0.224 0.642 -2.716 2.632
Concentration (C) -0.238 0.220 -1.336 0.658
Extensive Margin (N ) 0.333 0.576 -2.374 2.810
Panel D. Products with five or more exporters
Mean s.d. Min Max
Total -0.115 0.261 -2.354 0.989
Aggregate Market Power (M) -0.203 0.582 -2.713 2.632
Concentration (C) -0.280 0.217 -1.336 0.658
Extensive Margin (N ) 0.368 0.511 -2.169 2.717
Calculations made by using baseline results in Table 2.2, Column 3 using non-standardized coefficients. Panels A
and C include all 3102 HS6 products in sample and Panel B and D include the 1843 products with five or more
exporting firms.
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Given that the comparison has been set in terms of high and low ΨC, the difference
in the trade elasticity due to concentration is higher (3.527 at the average). This
means that the differential impact on imports due to concentration alone can be
almost doubled at 23 log points (3.527×−0.066).
In 40% percent of products there are less than five exporters selling into Colom-
bia. Given that I use the 10th and 90th percentiles to compare high and low concen-
tration, the low number of exporters may be understating the relevant heterogeneity.
In Panel B I show the same information but only for products in which there are five
or more exporters. Results show that the total differential elasticity is not higher
bur rather lower (1.699).
Finally, the magnitude of the decrease in tariffs could be systematically asso-
ciated to high and low exporters. In fact, countries that signed the FTA had an
initially higher Ψ. If that is the case, then we may find that the actual predicted
change in imports differ for high and low concentration countries. In Panel C I show
that this is not the case since the average change in imports for HC exporters is 13
log points lower than for LC exporters, the same as the average change in imports
when the average change in tariffs is used. Panel D replicates results for products
with five or more exporters and conclusions do not differ.
2.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I employed the hybrid model to derive a gravity equation in
changes and showed that granular firms introduce an extra margin of adjustment
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into the trade cost elasticity. On top of the intensive and extensive margin, the model
implies an oligopolistic margin that depends on both exporter-specific concentration
and the bilateral importance of exporter-specific granular firms. This extra margin
comes from large firm’s markup adjustments when trade costs change. The higher
exporter concentration, the lower is the impact of trade costs on import growth.
I tested the model using changes in discriminatory trade policy in Colombia. I
exploited diff-in-diff variation in tariffs due to both a unilateral trade liberalization
and the signature of free trade agreements over the 2010-2013 period and found
robust evidence for the oligopolistic margin. Using the preferred specification, I
derived quantitative implications relative to the standard gravity equation, which
is microfounded under monopolistic and competitive behavior. I found that import
growth is predicted to be significantly lower for the top 19% of import flows in terms
of initial exporter concentration. Moreover, I found that the aggregate effect of the
decrease in tariffs was lower than the average effect due to oligopolistic behavior,
which suggests that further exploring the aggregate implications of this model can
be an avenue for future research.
I found that imports from countries at the top decile in terms of firm concen-
tration were predicted to have 13 log points lower growth on average than imports
from countries at the bottom decile. This implies that accounting for oligopolistic
behavior may be important for trade policy when there is high concentration, since
gains may be lower when signing agreements with less competitive countries. Given
the usual political constraints this kind of policies face, policy makers should account
for this mechanism when signing trade agreements and lowering tariffs, potentially
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focusing on signing agreements with more competitive partners.
This chapter only addresses changes in policy of a single importer, but future
research should consider extending the analysis to a multi-importer setting. The
main difficulty of doing that may be obtaining firm level data to construct concen-
tration measures for different bilateral trade flows. On this regard, using exporter
concentration data such as the included in the EDD may be the way to move the
understanding of gravity equations under different forms of competition forward.
79
Chapter 3: Trade Policy Uncertainty and Firm Concentration
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I explore the implications of the hybrid model in a setting
with trade policy uncertainty (TPU). One of the main goals of preferential trade
agreements has been to secure preferences among their members (cf. Limão, 2016).
However, recent work has shown that current trade policy disagreements may be
undermining that goal by increasing the probability of policy reversals. In this
chapter, I extend the hybrid model developed in Chapter 1 by introducing TPU in
a setting with both oligopolistic and monopolistic competitive firms. I characterize
industries based on how oligopolistic behavior modifies the standard framework
through industrial concentration. I also propose an strategy for future empirical
research.
I characterize the relationship between TPU and oligopolistic behavior by con-
structing a model that features both. I apply the Handley-Limão framework (HL
framework henceforth), where an increase in either the probability of policy reversals
or tail risk lowers the entry cost cutoff of exporters, reducing the number of available
varieties for consumers and thus consumer welfare. I find that exporter concentra-
tion amplifies the negative impact of TPU on entry by allowing oligopolistic firms to
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offset part of the increase in tariffs by reducing markups. On the contrary, domestic
concentration mitigates the impact of TPU because higher tariffs are expected to
be offset by higher domestic markups.
The model predicts an augmented gravity equation in changes that accounts
for both a variable trade cost elasticity and an uncertainty factor that reduces export
growth. This feature of the model can be useful to evaluate ongoing and recent trade
policy disagreements in the context of concerns about increasing industrial concen-
tration.1 I propose applying the model to the United Kingdom (UK) exit process
from the European Union (EU), the so-called Brexit. The model extends Graziano
et al. (2018), a paper that applies the HL framework in this setting. Given that
different sectors faced different threats, they exploit the time-varying probability
and the sector-varying threat to identify the effect of Brexit uncertainty. I propose
an additional channel that provides extra industry variation: the concentration of
large firms.
This chapter relates and extends the TPU literature by allowing for oligopolis-
tic behavior. In recent years, a number of papers applied the HL framework to
different settings. Handley and Limão (2015) apply this framework to the accession
of Portugal to the EU, whereas Handley and Limão (2017) study the impact of
China’s World Trade Organization accession on US’s imports from that country. In
both cases, the authors show the impact of a decrease in TPU on exporter entry
and export flows. Carballo et al. (2018), Graziano et al. (2018), and Graziano et
1Examples are the US withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership, the US-China Trade War,
and the Argentinian withdrawal from MERCOSUR’s current FTA negotiations.
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al. (2020), study the impact of an increase in uncertainty. In the first case, they
study how the increase in demand and policy uncertainty caused by the Great Re-
cession negatively impacted export investments. Moreover, they show that trade
agreements can provide insurance against tail risk. Graziano et al. (2018), GHL
henceforth, study the negative impact of an increase in the probability of tail risk due
to Brexit uncertainty in the case of EU-UK trade, whereas Graziano et al. (2020)
extend the analysis to countries that have a FTA with the EU. In this chapter, I
follow the GHL setting but allow firms to have an impact on the counterfactual,
higher-tariffs industry price index. Handley and Limão (2017) allowed for this type
of general equilibrium effects. In my case, I exploit the fact that the hybrid model
delivers a variable elasticity that depends on both large and small firms’ behavior
to characterize such effect.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to characterize the impact
of TPU when there is oligopolistic behavior. Doing so can provide a valuable tool for
analyzing trade policy in a context of increasing concentration and tariffs threats.
Even though the model inherits a series of technical limitations from the oligopolistic
literature (cf. Head and Spencer, 2017), it provides a strategy to partially overcome
them. I assume that the entry cutoff only affects monopolistic competitive firms and
not larger, oligopolistic firms, which in the context of the hybrid model means that
there will be surviving non-granular exporters, had the worst state is realized. A
key object to link the theory with the data in the HL framework is the “uncertainty
factor” that modifies the gravity equation. As shown in Chapter 2, the hybrid
model also provides a gravity equation in changes that is augmented along the
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oligopolistic dimension. In this chapter, I put both extensions together and show
that we can use a gravity equation to identify the interaction between the two.
The key intuition is that the price index elasticity resulting from the hybrid model
modifies the uncertainty factor, providing an additional source of variation.
In Section 2 I show how the hybrid model can be merged with the HL frame-
work. In Section 3 I propose an empirical strategy to derive the empirical equation
and bring the model to the data by employing the Brexit case as an illustrative
application. Section 4 concludes and suggests future applications and extensions.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Environment
The environment is the same as in Chapter 2, with exporter-specific large and
small firms selling differentiated varieties in a given importing country. I explain
below how I merge this setting with the HL framework.
3.2.2 Entry Decisions under Trade Policy Uncertainty
Firms know their productivity and only enter into the market if their expected
profits net of the entry cost, Πe–K, are higher than the expected value of waiting,
Πw. As before, I assume that large firms are present in the market over the period
of time we consider and do not exit.2 Therefore, only small firms face the entry
2As discussed in Chapter 1, even though the probability of exit of large firms is not zero, the
probability of exit of the top quintile of firms is substantially lower than the probability of exit of
smaller firms (Eaton et al., 2007).
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decision. Given that small and large firms only interact with each other through
the price index, we can use the HL framework to derive a cost cutoff at which small











where asct captures business conditions in state s faced by c at t, c
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ct is the small
firms’ cost cutoff, and rc = {γ, H̄c(ac)} is the trade policy regime, with γ being the
probability of a trade policy shock. Given that I use a bounded Pareto distribution




L in equilibrium. This implies
that worsening business conditions still allow for a fraction of small firms to enter.





















(ω̄hct − 1) = −H̄c(act)
act − E(a′ct ≤ act)
act
∈ (−1, 0] (3.3)
Equation 3.2 differs from the expression in GHL in a fundamental way. The
existence of large exporting firms implies they can affect the overall price index.
This introduces the ratio of P
PD
as an additional term in the entry cutoff, which
captures how much higher is the current price index relative to the price index
3Details in Appendix A.1.3.
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under certain future conditions.4 That term can be eliminated by noting that cDsct
would not be capturing the deterministic cutoff. Other than that, the derivation is
identical to GHL, since large firms will be modifying small firm behavior through
their expected profits conditional on the shock, ω̄hct− 1, which captures the different
tail risk scenarios they face.
3.2.3 Policy Risk
I assume there are two potential trade policy distributions. One of them is
HR, which assigns probability η to an absorbing state with high import tariffs (HT ),
and 1− η to an absorbing state with low tariffs (LT ). Other trade policies, such as
non-tariff barriers, and trade costs are assumed to be certain. An example of such
setting is a FTA member that is uncertain about its future preferential status. The
other distribution is HQ, which assigns the low tariffs absorbing state with certainty.
I assume policy is drawn from HR with probability m and from HQ with probability
1−m, and also that firms are facing low tariffs currently. I illustrate this in Figure
3.1.5
4This term is also present in Handley and Limão (2017) when they analyze the general equilib-
rium implications of TPU.
5If current tariffs are higher than in the LT state, then small domestic firms would also face
TPU. This means that there would be another cutoff of interest that can be modified by the
industry’s market structure.
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(1 − 𝜂𝜂) 
 
𝜏𝜏𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝜏𝜏̅ 
𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 > 𝜏𝜏̅ 
The probability tree and event space in Figure 3.1 imply the following for the












































Given that the impact of exporters is not negligible, Equation 3.3 also has to
account for the transition from the current state to either absorbing state LT or
HT .6 This is an unavoidable issue given the existence of large firms: all scenarios
potentially involve some degree of risk for a subset of small firms. If policy is drawn
6The transition takes time because incumbent firms above the entry cutoff remain profitable
(costs are sunk) and thus exit only after a death shock, after which point they do not re-enter.
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from the Q distribution, then there will be more entry of foreign firms and a decrease
in large firms’ markups. Given that tariffs would not change and domestic firms were
already facing the lowest level of protection, this causes a decrease in the price index
relative to the uncertain state. The R distribution has tail risk because it assigns
positive probability to the HT state, which involves an increase in tariffs. In that
scenario, the price index would increase, allowing large firms to modify markups,
potentially offsetting part of the direct effect.
Factors gHTct and g
LT
ct capture the transition process caused by the exit of firms
towards the new stationary state via exogenous death and non-reentry. In the first
case, exit will happen on the foreign side, whereas in the second case on the domestic
side.
3.2.4 Uncertainty Factor
To characterize the change in entry due to uncertainty we have to understand
how the uncertainty factor differs across industries and exporters facing the same
trade policy regime. To do so, I derive a second order approximation of logU with











|u0 ≡ εc̄ is the price index elasticity with respect to tariffs from
7Derivation and details in Appendix A.1.4. I omit time subscripts for clarity.
8β̃ ≡ βγ2(1−β(1−γ))
87
all countries that could face higher tariffs (c̄), evaluated at u0. The approximation
point implies that the effect is only explained by the cross-elasticity of uncertainty
and risk, ∂
2 logU
∂ log τHTc̄ ∂m
. Having large firms implies that such elasticity is heterogeneous
across sectors not only due differential trade policy, but also due to differences in
their industry characteristics.
In order to characterize how the heterogeneous effect across industries, let’s





where H̃c̄ = 1−hlc̄Ψlc̄+(1−hlc̄)Λsc̄ σσ−1 .
9 Equation 3.10 shows that εc̄ captures the
direct impact of the potential increase in tariffs, sc̄, modified by a factor that corrects
by the relative importance of c̄ countries firms’ equilibrium responses through entry
and markups.
Given that εc̄ <
σ
σ−1 as shown in Chapter 1, the sign of the cross-elasticity
and thus the uncertainty factor around no uncertainty is well-defined. This implies
that the higher the R probability m and the HT tariff threat log τHT , the lower
the uncertainty factor and thus entry. On the contrary, the higher εc̄ the lower the
impact of uncertainty on export entry. In GHL, this last term is not present because
they assume that exporters are small relative to the domestic market. However,
that assumption is not compatible with having oligopolistic firms. As a result,
9Recall that H = sc̄Hc̄ + (1− sc̄)H−c̄, where Hc̄ = 1− hlc̄Ψlc̄ + (1− hlc̄)Λsc̄.
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higher εc̄ implies a larger increase in the price index, which partially offsets the
eventual impact of tariffs. Thus, industry heterogeneity acts through the price
index’s response.
Finally, note that the LT absorbing state does not have a direct impact on
the uncertainty factor because there that state does not imply an increase in tariffs.
3.2.5 Industry Characteristics
The price index elasticity depends on different industry characteristics. I dis-
cuss below potentially observable variables that provide intuition for the impact of
TPU and can be linked to underlying parameters of the model.
Proposition 6 Trade Policy Uncertainty and Industry Characteristics.
In the hybrid model with oligopolistic competition the impact of TPU shocks in re-
ducing firm entry and exports is:
(i) mitigated by the market share of exporters facing TPU,
(ii) amplified by the market share of large firms within countries facing TPU,
(iii) amplified by the concentration of large firms within countries facing TPU,
(iv) mitigated by the concentration of large firms within countries not facing TPU.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.6.
Proposition 6 summarizes under which observable industry characteristics we
should expect a higher or lower uncertainty factor, all else equal. Point (i) says
that, conditional on the HT tariff, surviving exporting firms in industries where
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the market share of exporting countries facing TPU is higher should face lower
uncertainty because the price index is expected to increase more, partially offsetting
the direct tariff effect.
Point (ii) implies that the share of large oligopolistic firms in export flows
facing TPU has a negative effect on entry. The intuition is that in flows where
large firms have a higher share and thus oligopolistic competition is relatively more
important, the increase in the price index as a result of an increase in tariffs is
mitigated by changes in markups. As a result, the offsetting effect is lower and
there is less entry.
Point (iii) says that firm concentration as captured by Ψlc̄ within all countries
facing TPU will amplify the impact of TPU relative to a monopolistic competitive
setting. The reason is that high concentration implies a low tariff pass-through and
therefore the price index would not increase as it would otherwise, implying a rela-
tively tougher competitive environment. The opposite is true for firm concentration
within all countries not facing TPU in point (iv).
The following corollaries identify a special case that can be of particular in-
terest.
Corollary 1 Import penetration mitigates the impact of uncertainty shocks in re-
ducing firm entry and exports when all exporters face TPU.
Proof: By defining c̄ as domestic firms and relying on the proof of Proposition 6.
When all foreign exporters face TPU in the domestic economy, the only firms
not facing TPU are domestic firms. Therefore, high import penetration implies that
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the price index will increase at a greater extent offsetting a higher fraction of the
negative impact through lower entry.
Corollary 2 Domestic concentration mitigates the impact of uncertainty shocks in
reducing firm entry and exports when all exporters face TPU.
Proof: By defining c̄ as domestic firms and relying on the proof of Proposition 6.
Similarly, a high Ψld implies that when protection increases, large domestic
firms will increase markups at a greater extent, which will further increase the price
index leaving more residual demand for small exporting firms. Both corollaries
suggest that the increase in import penetration and domestic concentration observed
in developed countries in recent years could have decreased the cost of TPU for
consumers.
3.2.6 Oligopoly-Augmented Gravity Equation under Trade Policy
Uncertainty
The uncertainty factor modifies the entry cutoff of the hybrid model and there-
fore the augmented gravity equation in changes derived in Chapter 2 is incomplete
to capture oligopolistic behavior under uncertainty. The following proposition cap-
tures both mechanisms relative to a standard model without TPU and oligopolistic
behavior:
Proposition 7 Oligopoly-Augmented Gravity Equation under Trade Pol-
icy Uncertainty. In the hybrid model with oligopolistic competition and trade
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policy uncertainty, the gravity equation in changes is:
d logMUct = d logM
D









(1− hU,lct )Λsctd logUt (3.11)
where c̄ identifies exporters facing trade policy uncertainty, MUct is imports from





is the change in
imports due to firms equilibrium responses to trade policy uncertainty.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.7.
Proposition 7 shows that trade growth is reduced by the direct impact of TPU




cpt captures at which extent other
firms will respond to the impact of uncertainty on entry and may be either positive
or negative depending on the importance of small firms. In addition, note that the
extent at which TPU directly affects trade flows is lower than in the standard HL
framework because large firms are not affected by exit in the short run. Finally, the
pass-through from changes in trade and production costs need to be accounted for
as with deterministic policy.
3.3 Empirical Discussion
In this section I discuss a potential empirical application for this model. I
extend the analysis of Brexit uncertainty in the context of GHL using a similar
empirical strategy to the one in Chapter 2.
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3.3.1 Trade Policy Uncertainty under Brexit
The UK referendum held to decide whether to leave the EU, the so-called
Brexit process, reduced UK-EU bilateral trade through lower exporter entry because
of TPU, as shown by GHL. In 2015, after the Conservative Party UK general election
victory, Prime Minister Cameron delivered in the campaign promise of holding a
referendum to decide UK’s EU membership status. By opening a formal channel for
exiting the EU, the Prime Minister introduced a tangible mechanism through which
UK and EU firms could lose their reciprocal preferential treatment. In other words,
that election introduced a TPU shock that induced firms to consider the alternative
scenarios they could face depending on the referendum outcome. The referendum
took place in June 2016, when the Brexit option won.
In GHL, the authors characterize the event space firms faced before the ref-
erendum by interpreting the referendum probability as the probability of drawing
policy from a riskier policy distribution HBR, instead of the less risky HEU . Condi-
tional on drawing policy from HBR, they identified alternative states: renegotiation,
FTA, MFN, and a trade war, where FTA refers to duty-free trade under a Free Trade
Agreement, and MFN refers to having Most Favored Nation status, as WTO mem-
bers not holding an agreement with the EU do. We can map their setting to the
model presented in this chapter as follows. The MFN is the HT state, whereas rene-
gotiation, FTA and EU states can be grouped into the LT state, assuming away
uncertain non-tariff barriers for simplicity of exposition. GHL showed that firms
did not believe trade war was likely so I disregard this possibility.
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3.3.2 Empirical Equation
In order to transform equation 3.11 into an empirical equation, I follow the
same approach as in Chapter 2. In that chapter, I switched the gravity equation from
marginal changes with respect to a steady state setting to an equation in discrete
changes. Such transformation can be interpreted as a first order approximation
around the equilibrium. Below I show the full equation:10
∆0 logMcpt = (1− hlcp,0)Λscp,0∆0 logUcp,t +
+ [1 + (1− hlcp,0)Λscp,0]∆0 logEp,t −
− (σ − 1)[1 + (1− hlcp,t−1)
σ
σ − 1
Λscp,0 − hlcp,0Ψcp,0]∆0 log τcp,t +
+ (σ − 1)[1 + (1− hlcp,0)Λscp,0 − hlcp,0Ψcp,0]
[
∆0 logPp,t −
− ∆0 log Tcp,t −∆0 logwc,t
]
+ (1− hlcp,0)∆0 logN scp,t + vip,t (3.12)
where ∆0 refers to differences against the steady state.
3.3.2.1 Identifying Assumptions
In Chapter 2 I made identifying assumptions that helped me to construct an
empirical equation that could be applied in that setting. In this case, I slightly
modify them to allow variation across different trade flows along the dimensions










addressed by Proposition 6.
A1a. Constant deep parameters σ and k across importers, exporters, products and
time.
A1b. Two types of products in steady state: products with high concentration, ΨH ,
and products with low concentration, ΨL.
A2. Exogenous exporter-specific production costs wc.
A3. Elasticity of substitution across products equal to one.
A4. Potential entrants are determined by a product-specific, exporter-specific and






cp, with E(log ζ
s) = 0.
A5. Transport cost and tariffs are constant over this period of time (∆ log Tcp,t = 0
and ∆ log τcp,t = 0)
The key difference is that I assume there are two types of sectors in steady
state: those with high and low firm concentration. A way of understanding this in
light of the model is assuming different upper productivity bound across sectors.
3.3.2.2 Estimating Equation
The previous identifying assumptions deliver the following estimating equa-
tion:
logMcp,t = (1− hl,X)Λs,X logUcp,t +
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cp,0] + ucpt (3.13)
where X ∈ (L,H) identifies the type of sector in terms of exporter concentra-
tion.
Figure 3.1 shows the trade policy stochastic process, and equation 3.9 shows
the second order approximation capturing the impact of changes in the probability
of drawing from the riskier distribution, m, and the MFN tariff threat, log τMFN ,
in the case of Brexit. The following equation shows the uncertainty factor in the






m log τMFN (3.14)
The key difference with respect to GHL is that there are two conditional un-
certainty factors that depend on εX , one for high and another for low concentration.
Under the conditions presented in this section, the coefficient will have the
following structural interpretation:







This coefficient differs from the one in GHL in three ways. First, εX lowers
the cross-elasticity magnitude as long as TPU modifies the overall price index, but
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does not fully offset it. This result is in line with Handley and Limão (2017), where
they prove that this effect cannot offset the direct effect. Second, the fact that TPU
only impacts entry of small firms implies that the coefficient will be lower when the
share of exports of large firms is high. Therefore, if sectors with high concentration
of large firms are correlated with sectors where the share of large firms is high, the
impact on exports may not be as high as predicted by Proposition 6. Third, the
hazard function also amplifies the effect. If there are few varieties sold in the market,
the impact will be larger.
3.4 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I merged the HL framework with the hybrid model developed
in Chapter 1 in order to characterize how TPU impacts export flows when there are
firms that behave oligopolistically. I showed that when there are small monopolistic
competitive firms and granular oligopolistic firms competing in a market, an increase
in TPU modifies the cross-elasticity of uncertainty and risk due to large firms’
markup responses. When foreign exporters are highly concentrated, the aggregate
pass-through of tariffs to large firms’ prices is reduced and therefore the effect of
TPU on small firms is amplified. On the contrary, when large domestic firms are
highly concentrated, the impact of TPU is partially offset by an increase in domestic
markups, which reduces the magnitude of the cross-elasticity.
This way of modeling oligopolistic behavior helps in characterizing the impact
of TPU but also has limitations. First, this model is valid mostly in the short
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run since large firms are not assumed to make sunk investments. Second, properly
bringing this model to the data can be demanding since it requires having firm-level
bilateral export values and concentration for the trade flows included in the sample.
The model as is has implications for policy in the short run. Given that the
impact on consumer welfare is expected to be milder in sectors with high domes-
tic concentration and low foreign concentration, policy makers may be inclined to
threaten sectors with these characteristics. In this sense, high domestic concentra-
tion may offset the impact of high markups by providing more room for foreign
exporters in contexts with policy uncertainty.
This model provides an extra channel through which TPU can have a testable
differential impact. Future research may want to exploit this dimension in the
context of generalized tariff hikes threats. For instance, a threat of an increase in
x% in tariffs across many sectors may impact them differently, depending on their
market structures. This type of threats have been common in the last years, during
the 45th US president tenure. Moreover, many proposed tariff hikes did materialize,
providing credibility to his threats.
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Appendix A: Proofs and Analytic Derivations
A.1 Analytic Derivations
A.1.1 Markups and Elasticity of Demand of Large Firms
Firms maximize the their profits by choosing quantities taking into account
their effect on aggregates (I omit industry subscripts).
Firms’ i in r problem:
max
qlr,i
(plr,i/τ − clf,iTr)qlf,i (A.1)














r,i − clr,iTrτ = 0 (A.2)
where (plr,i)
′
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r,iTrτ (A.3)


























(σ − 1)(1− slr,i)
(A.4)









slr,i + (1− slr,i)/σ
(A.5)
where it can be seen that −νlr,i is decreasing in slr,i and therefore large firms
face a more inelastic demands.
A.1.2 First Order Approximation of Ψ



















1 + (σ − 2)slr,i
(A.6)



































where I used slr,i ≡ sfhlrzlf . Putting all together:

































A.1.3 Entry Cutoff under Uncertainty
This derivation is adapted from Carballo et al. (2018) as used in Graziano et
al. (2018). I need the following value functions to derive the cutoff:
(i) the value of exporting
Πe(at, c, r) = π(at, c) + β(1− γ)Πe(at, c, r) + γEΠe(a′, c, r)], (A.10)
(ii) the value of waiting
Πw (c, r) = 0+β
(






(EΠe (a′ ≥ ā, c, r)−K),
(A.11)
and (iii) the conditional expected value of exporting if a′ ≥ ā
EΠe (a′ ≥ ā, c, r) = Eπ (a′ ≥ ā, c, r) + β(1− γ)EΠe (a′ ≥ ā, c, r) + βγEΠe(a′, c, r).
(A.12)
I obtain the cutoff expression by using the entry condition in (3.1); the value
functions in (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12), and the expression for EΠe(a′, c, r). In
contrast to GHL, a will be affected by large firm behavior.
A.1.4 Second Order Approximation of the Uncertainty Factor
Let’s define the ratio of the price index under absorbing state HT to the









around u0 = (0, 0) is:
logU (u) ≈ logU (u0)+(u− u0)·5 logU (u0)+
1
2
(u− u0)T (H logU (u0)) (u− u0) ,
(A.13)
where 5 is the gradient function and H logU (u0) is the Hessian matrix.
As shown in GHL, only the second order cross-derivatives are not zero in the
case of high tariffs around no uncertainty. Given that ω is a function of both τ and
Γ, this means we can use their result and simplify to the following expression:











The U derivatives are as follows:








)2 |u0 = −β̃σ (A.15)





(β̃(ΓM)σ−1 − β̃(τM)σ)m+ τσ
)2 |u0 = β̃(σ − 1) (A.16)
where β̃ ≡ βγ
1−β(1−γ) .
I only need to calculate the partial derivatives of log Γ with respect to log τHT :
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d log τHT (A.18)






















where ε is the price index elasticity, and ũ|u0 ≡ β̃m1+β̃m(ω̄−1) |u0 = 0.
Regarding gHT , we have:



















The key observation is that both cUs and cHT,st are the same under the ap-



















Let’s replace back into the U approximation and rearranging:



























A.2.1 Proposition 1. Relative Market Shares Response to Trade Lib-
eralization.






where clf,j > c
l
f,i. Note that by proving for τ it can be extended to any change
in the relative price of imports.






therefore d log zlf,i = d log(p
l
f,i)
1−σ − d log(P lf )1−σ. Given that, we only need to
derive d log(plf,i)
1−σ since d log zlf,i − d log zlf,j = d log(plf,i)1−σ − d log(plf,j)1−σ.




d log slf,i + d log τ (A.25)
where I assumed fixed clf,i and Tf . Note that d log s
l
f,i = (1−σ)d log plf,i− (1−
σ)d logP . Therefore:
d log plf,i =
slf,i
1− slf,i
(1− σ)[d log plf,i − d logP ] + d log τ







d log τ (A.26)
where I used the definition ψlf,i ≡ −
∂ log µlf,i
∂ log plf,i





Subtract the price of the two large foreign firms:































d log τ/P +
ψlf,j
1 + ψlf,j
d log τ/P (A.27)
where in the second line I used 1
1+ψlf,i





d log zlf,i − d log zlf,j = (σ − 1)[
ψlf,i
1 + ψlf,i
d log τ/P −
ψlf,j
1 + ψlf,j
d log τ/P ]
=
σ − 1











> 0, we need ψlf,i − ψlf,j > 0 which follows from the
fact that zlf,i > z
l
f,j.
The second point holds symmetrically by comparing two domestic firms and
noting that τ = 1. The decrease in τ decreases P and then increases the ratio
zld,i′/z
l





A.2.2 Proposition 2. Large Firms Price Index and Concentration.
To prove that Ψlf is a proper concentration measure it suffices to show that































(σ − 1) sfzf,i ((σ − 2) sfzf,i + 2)
((σ − 2) sfzf,i + 1)2
(A.29)
m′′Ψf =
2 (σ − 1) sf
((σ − 2) sfzf,i + 1)3
> 0 (A.30)
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Which proves that a mean preserving spread of Ψlf increases its value and
therefore it is a proper firm concentration measure.
A.2.3 Proposition 3. Industry Price Index Elasticity.
A.2.3.1 Decomposition
Totally differentiating the price index I get:
d logP = hld logP l + (1− hl)d logP s (A.31)
where hl = (P
l)1−σ
(P l)1−σ+(P s)1−σ
. Hence, I can derive the impact on each subset of
firms and then add them up.
Large Firms. Rewriting the price index of domestic and foreign large firms di-
rectly as a function of the individual firms’ prices we get:
d logP l = slfd logP
l


















We already derived d log plf,k =
ψlf,k
1+ψlf,k




d log τ when proving
Proposition 1, thus:
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f logP + s
l
f (1−Ψlf )d log τ + (1− slf )Ψldd logP
= Ψl logP + slf (1−Ψlf )d log τ (A.34)













, and I defined ∂ logP
l
∂ logP
≡ slfΨlf + (1− slf )Ψld ≡ Ψ.
Small Firms. We can analogously write the change in small firms’ price index as
follows:
d logP s = ssfd logP
s





































k − (σ − 1)
]
(A.36)
where I need that k − (σ − 1) > 0 to have a well-defined Pareto distribution
of sales.
Differentiating this expression yields:
d log(P sf )
1−σ = (1− σ)d log τ + λsfd log csf,∗ (A.37)





is the hazard function of foreign











d log(P sf )























d log τ (A.38)
where I assumed exogenous Tf and E. The small domestic firms price index
is analogous but without the direct tariff impact. Therefore, both effects are:






d log τ (A.39)
d logP sd = −Λsdd logP (A.40)
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where I defined Λsf ≡
λsf
σ−1 as in the text.
Therefore, the total impact of small firms is:
d logP s = ssf
[


















d log τ (A.41)
where Λs ≡ ssfΛsf + (1− ssf )Λsd.
Total Impact. To derive the total impact of τ on P we put together previous
derivations:
d logP = hl
[






















d log τ (A.42)




hlslf (1−Ψlf ) + (1− hl)ssf (1 + Λsf σσ−1)
H
(A.43)




= Θl + Θs (A.44)










, and Λ̃sf ≡ Λsf σσ−1 . Then, we can

























= hlslf + (h
l)2
slf (1− slf )
H






(1− hl)ssf (1 + Λ̃sf )
H



















= (1− hl)ssf +
(1− hl)2ssf
H




(Λ̃sf − (1− h
l)Λsf + h
lΨl)
= (1− hl)ssf + (1− hl)2
ssf (1− ssf )
H






where a ≡ h
l(σ−1)+1




= sf + (h
l)2
slf (1− slf )
H
(Ψld −Ψlf ) + (1− hl)2
ssf (1− ssf )
H





ssf (1− slf )[Ψld + bΛsf ]− (1− ssf )slf [Ψlf + Λsd]
]
(A.47)




. Note that b = 1 in the case of d logP
d log Tf
because the cost cutoff
elasticity with respect to the price index and trade costs is the same.
A.2.3.2 Sign
This result follows directly from equation A.43. We can further reduced it by
noting that hlslf = sfh
l
f and hence h







where H̃f ≡ 1− hlfΨlf + (1− hlf )Λsf σσ−1 .
Given that 1 − hlΨl and 1 − hlfΨlf are both positive because both hl and Ψl
are between zero and one, this expression is always negative.











where Hr ≡ 1− hlrΨlr + (1− hlr)Λsr and the last term corrects for the fact that
tariffs are paid by consumers, not producers. In the potential extreme case in which
there are only foreign small firms we have that:
1 +
Λlf





(σ − 1)(1 + Λlf )
(A.50)









cannot take values higher than σ
σ−1 .
Note that in the case of the price index elasticity relative to trade costs paid
by producers, Tf , the upper bound is 1 because the last term in equation A.49 is
not present.
A.2.4 Proposition 4. Domestic Concentration and Competition.
A.2.4.1 Decomposition
In order to prove part (a) of this proposition, I will employ any proper con-
centration measure increasing in market shares C, noting the special case of homo-





t, with t > 1. When t = 2 then
Ch = HHI.






where m(zd,i;Wd) is a function of internal market shares zd,i and can contain
other factors, which I summarize in Wd. The theoretical version of it needs to

































i d log z
l
d,i + ι



















i to be the weighted elasticity of changes in the large firm ag-
gregate market share.























i d log p
l












d log pld,i (A.54)




Assuming that the concentration function is homogeneous of degree t simplifies



















. As a result, the term for large






d log pld,i in the case of Ch.
Small Firms. Small firms are atomistic so the effect of competition on concen-















































































k − t(σ − 1)
]
(A.56)
where I need that k − t(σ − 1) > 0 to have a well-defined Pareto distribution
of sales to the power of t.




m[(1− hld)z(j)]dGs(j) = td log(1− hld) + λst,dd logP +
+ t(σ − 1)d logP sd (A.57)









and I used that d log csd,∗ = d logP .





m[(1− hld)z(j)]dGs(j) = td log(1− hld) + [λst,d − tλsd]d logP (A.58)
Total Impact. Adding up both derivations in the case of homogeneous concen-
tration functions yields:








+ [λst,d − tλsd]d logP + t
1− 2hld
1− hld
d log hld (A.59)




The change in log hld captures the reallocation of market share between large
and small firms and is as follows:
d log hld = (1− σ)
[ Nd∑
i=1
zd,id log pd,i − d logPd
]
= (1− σ)Ψldd logP − (1− σ)hldd logP ld − (1− σ)(1− hld)d logP sd
]
= (1− hld)(1− σ)[Ψld + Λsd]d logP (A.60)












+ [λst,d − tλsd] +
+ t(1− 2hld)(1− σ)[Ψld + Λsd] (A.61)




I follow the same approach than in the proof of Proposition 4 where I use any
concentration measure homogeneous of degree t and note that the HHI is a special
case when t = 2.









which means that the sign of the large firms effect is negative (since it is multiplied
by (1− σ)).
(1) First, I need to show that there exists a firm i∗ above which γi − zi > 0.
For any i, we can write it as follows:















are weights that put more weight on larger firms given
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that t > 1. Define ω̄ = 1/N as the particular case for which all shares are equally
weighted. Given that
∑N
j=1 zj = 1, we can write it as:






This expression shows that it is the difference of the contribution of observation
i between using ωi and ω̄ weights.
I claim there is a i∗ such that:
(i) γi − zi ≥ 0 if i∗ ≥ i
(ii) γi − zi < 0 if i∗ < i







but given that ωi is increasing in zi, then the contribution of i > i
∗ has to be
higher for these weights. Thus, γi − zi > 0 for i > i∗.
To prove claim (ii), we can follow the same logic assuming that l < i∗ and







but given that ωl is increasing in zl, then the contribution of i < i
∗ has to be
lower for these weights. Thus, γl − zl ≤ 0 for i < i∗.
(2) Define Xi =
ψld,i
1+ψld,i
and Zi = γ
l
d,i − zld,i. Define two sets of firms: A for
firms such as i∗ ≥ i and B for firm such as i∗ > i. Since Xi is increasing in zi then
XBi > X
A














i∈B Zi, and Z
A
i = Zi/Z
A and ZBi = Zi/Z
B.






















The left hand side is a weighted average of all Xi in B and the right hand side




j for any i ∈ A








ZBi Xi > 0 (A.68)
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Sign of the Small Firms Effect. Assume the sign is positive:




− 1) > 0
λst,d
tλsd









k − t(σ − 1)




k − t(σ − 1)
tk − t(σ − 1)
> 1 (A.69)




∈ (0, 1). This means we can define the LHS as the function
F(t;σ, k, v) and given that t ∈ (1,∞), check the limit of F at both boundaries:
lim
t→∞





k − t(σ − 1)












− (σ − 1)








− (σ − 1)
limt→∞(1− vk−t(σ−1))
= 0 (A.70)
where the last result follows from limt→∞
k
t
= 0 and limt→∞ v
k−t(σ−1) = ∞.
This means that as t increases the impact of P on small firms concentration is
negative because the inequality A.69 is a contradiction.
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When t→ 1+, we have:
lim
t→1+
F(t;σ, k, v) = 1 (A.71)
Therefore, if dF
dt
< 0 for all t ∈ (1,∞), the inequality A.69 is contradiction for















where the sign follows from 1−v
k−(σ−1)









A.69 is a contradiction for all the support and hence the sign of the small firms
effect is negative. Note that this includes t = 2, the HHI particular case.
Sign of the Cross-Effect. The sign of the cross-size effect depends on the relative
market share between small domestic and large firms. If we assume that large
domestic firms have more than half of the market (hld >
1
2
), then this term is
negative because both Ψld and Λ
s
d are positive.
Overall sign. The large and small firms’ effects are negative. Given that the
cross-size effect is positive if hld <
1
2
, then having hld ≥ 12 is sufficient to have a
negative overall effect.
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A.2.5 Proposition 5. Oligopoly-Augmented Gravity Equation and
Partial Trade Elasticity.






Log-differentiating this equation yields:




cd + (1− hlcd)d logM scd (A.74)
I proceed by deriving each term separately.
Large Firms. The change in total imports of large firms’ varieties can be calcu-
lated as the change in the expenditure share given the exogeneity of E:
d logM lcd = (1− σ)
[∂ logP lcd
∂ log τcd
d log τcd +
∂ logP lcd
∂ log Tcd






− d logP 1−σd + d logEd
= (1− σ)(1−Ψlcd)
[
d log τcd + d log Tcd − d logPd
]







= (1 − Ψlcd) and
∂ logP lcd
∂ logPd
= Ψlcd as shown in
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Proposition 1.
Small Firms. To derive total imports of small firms’ varieties, which includes
entry, we need to calculate M sf by integrating over the support of c.






















































d log Tcd +
σ
σ − 1







d logEd + d logNcd (A.77)
All Firms. Using equation A.74 I get:
d logMcd = (1− σ)
[
1 + (1− hlcd)Λscd − hlcdΨlcd
][
d log Tcd +
σ
σ − 1





1 + (1− hlcd)Λscd
]
d logEd + (1− hlcd)d logNcd (A.78)
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A.2.6 Proposition 6. Trade Policy Uncertainty and Industry Char-
acteristics.































Using the previously defined equilibrium responses for countries facing and
not facing uncertainty, Hc̄ = 1 − hlc̄Ψlc̄ + (1 + hlc̄)Λsc̄ > 0 and H−c̄ = 1 − hl−c̄Ψl−c̄ +
(1 − hl−c̄)Λs−c̄ > 0, and the overall equilibrium response H = sc̄Hc̄ + (1 − sc̄)H−c̄, I
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× (−hl−c̄) > 0 (A.86)
where I am assuming that H − sc̄H̃c̄ = (1− sc̄)H−c̄ − sc̄(H̃c̄ −Hc̄) > 0, which
is the small difference that arises in the case of foreign firms due to the difference in
the cutoff elasticity between τ and P (if I use Tc̄, which is paid by producers, this
difference goes away).
A.2.7 Proposition 7. Oligopoly-Augmented Gravity Equation under
Trade Policy Uncertainty
Trade policy uncertainty modifies the cutoff when we condition on the overall
price effect, so we can write the change in imports as follows (where U captures the
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uncertainty state):









In the case of large firms, the equilibrium responses to small firms entry remain
the same:




d log τcd + d log Tcd − d logPUd
]
+ d logEd (A.88)
In the case of small firms, we have an additional term capturing uncertainty
that comes from the uncertainty factor multiplying the cost cutoff in equation 3.2:




d log Tcd +
σ
σ − 1











d logEd + d logNcd (A.89)
Therefore, the total change in imports is the sum of the two:
d logMUcd = (1− σ)
[








d log Tcd +
σ
σ − 1













d logEd + (1− hU,lcd )d logNcd (A.90)
This equation has the same structure but has an additional term capturing
uncertainty. Therefore, we can capture the full expression as follows
d logMUcd = d log M̄
U





= d logMDcd + d log
MUcd
MDcd
+ (1− hU,lcd )Λ
s
fd logUcd (A.91)
where the term d log
M̄Ucd
MDcd
captures how different imports are due to the equi-
librium response of all firms to lower small firm entry.
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Appendix B: Numerical Solution
The model is characterized by the set of equilibrium conditions defined in
equations 1.8-1.14. In order to solve it numerically, I nest the equilibrium condition
related to large firms into the conditions related to small firms. Specifically, I propose
a cutoff for domestic and foreign firms and calculate the price index for small firms.
Then I solve the oligopoly game played by large firms, conditional on the price index
of small firms’ varieties. With both indices, I construct the overall price index and
the resulting entry cutoffs. I compare the latest with the initially proposed cutoffs
and if the distance is outside the established tolerance, I iterate.
Formally, let’s define the set of parameters Θ ≡ {σ, k,K, β, cL, cH}, and the set




i=1}, where {N ld, N lf} ∈
Z+, and a policy variable τ .1






Therefore, I conduct the following steps:
1. I propose an initial set of cutoffs c0 ≡ {[csd,∗]0, [csf,∗]0} and calculate [P s]0 ≡
P s(c0; τ,Ξ,Θ).
1Note that by choosing N ld and cLd, and conditioning on cH , the number of domestic potential
entrants is determined and does not need to be added to the set of exogenous variables. The same
holds for the number of potential foreign entrants.
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2. I solve for large firm’s internal market shares: [zlr,i]
0 = zlr,i([P
s]0; τ,Ξ,Θ)],
for i = 1...N lr, r ∈ (d, f), and their overall share [sl]0 = sl([P s]0; τ,Ξ,Θ)]
conditional on the small firms’ price index [P s]0.
3. I construct the large firm’s price index:





4. I construct the overall price index P 0 = [([P s]0)1−σ + ([P l]0)1−σ]1/(1−σ).
5. Derive the new cutoffs c1 ≡ {[csd,∗(P 0; τ,Ξ,Θ)], [csf,∗(P 0; Ξ,Θ)]}
6. If |c1 − c0| < ε, then the problem is solved, otherwise I use c1 to iterate the
process.
This iterative process delivers a solution S(τ0, Tf0) conditional on the value of
the trade policy variable τ0. Given that each solution depends on the specific draw
of large firms productivities, I solve the model U times in each case and average







, where U = 1000.
In the numerical exercise, I vary either τ and Tf0, depending the case, such that
I get a set of solutions for the R values of these variables, τ : S̄ ≡ {S1(τ1), ..., SR(τR)},
or Tf : S̄ ≡ {S1(Tf1), ..., SR(τfR)}.
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Appendix C: Firm Proxy
In this appendix I employ an ANOVA approach to choose a proxy for foreign
firms based on the available information included in the DANE custom data.
C.1 Databases
The custom database from DANE contains information about the seller but
does not have an id number nor a name. Therefore, I consider the following infor-
mation included: the country and city of origin of the seller, which can differ from
the country of origin of the producer due to offshoring. The assumption is that the
agent that is deciding the optimal quantity produced is the firm that is selling the
product, no the one that is producing.
I consider different alternative combination of information to proxy for the
firm: 1) city and country of the seller (C), 2) city and country of the seller interacted
by the HS10 product category (CH), 3) country of the seller (N), 4) country of the
seller interacted by the HS10 product category (NH), 5) HS10 category alone (H).
In order to choose the optimal proxy, I employ the Export Dynamic Database
(EDD) which provides HS2-importer-exporter-year aggregate statistics related to
exports, number of firms and the distribution of trade. This database includes 53
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exporters, mostly developing countries, for different time periods ranging from 1997
to 2004. I keep all flows between 2004 and 2014 in which the importer is Colombia
to compare with DANE information regarding trade value, number of firms and the
HHI, the latter to capture information about the distribution of firms.
The EDD does not contains all imports from Colombia given that the reporters
are the exporters. Therefore, the comparison below is for trade flows that are present
in both samples (about 20%).
C.2 Descriptive Statistics for Different Proxies
In Table C.1 I show the average log imports across exporter-HS2 products
by year for both DANE and EDD for trade flows included in both samples. The
average is similar in terms of levels, showing that both databases are capturing the
same information.
Table C.1: Average log Imports for Comparable Flows in EDD and DANE.
Year EDD s.d. DANE s.d.
2004 12.851 0.120 12.658 0.136
2005 12.865 0.111 12.594 0.124
2006 12.942 0.106 12.543 0.117
2007 13.191 0.108 12.928 0.120
2008 13.258 0.104 12.937 0.119
2009 13.091 0.107 12.756 0.124
2010 13.349 0.109 13.090 0.121
2011 13.572 0.109 13.348 0.117
2012 13.431 0.104 13.223 0.117
2013 13.570 0.140 13.301 0.154
2014 13.617 0.170 13.485 0.179
Average and standard deviation (s.d.) of the log imports at the exporter-HS2 product level for observations in
both EDD and DANE databases.
Tables C.2 and C.3 show the average log number of firms and HHI for the
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EDD and the DANE database using the alternative firm proxies. Proxies can either
over or underestimate the average both variables. For instance, if there are more
than one firm per city then the proxy could be lower than the actual number of
firms. On the other hand, city variables are noisy even after cleaning. In this sense,
I could be counting a city more than once if the cleaning process did not exhaust all
possibilities. Note that errors that are related to specific cities and are constant over
time are not a problem for the regression analysis, given the fixed effect structure of
the empirical equation 2.5. Nonetheless, both the proxy number of firms and HHI
are close to the levels in the EDD.
Table C.2: Average log Number of Firms for Comparable Flows in EDD and DANE
by Type of Firm Proxy.
Year EDD s.d. C s.d. H s.d. HC s.d. HP s.d. P s.d.
2004 1.514 0.050 1.506 0.048 1.588 0.048 2.030 0.058 1.705 0.050 0.615 0.027
2005 1.697 0.048 1.634 0.046 1.722 0.045 2.204 0.054 1.865 0.047 0.706 0.027
2006 1.710 0.046 1.529 0.043 1.583 0.043 2.037 0.052 1.717 0.045 0.653 0.025
2007 1.710 0.047 1.646 0.044 1.679 0.044 2.182 0.054 1.833 0.047 0.722 0.027
2008 1.649 0.045 1.578 0.042 1.626 0.042 2.099 0.051 1.771 0.044 0.706 0.025
2009 1.706 0.046 1.576 0.044 1.630 0.043 2.114 0.053 1.780 0.046 0.705 0.026
2010 1.750 0.048 1.639 0.044 1.659 0.043 2.177 0.054 1.824 0.047 0.749 0.027
2011 1.849 0.049 1.688 0.045 1.710 0.043 2.235 0.054 1.886 0.047 0.815 0.028
2012 1.864 0.047 1.750 0.044 1.721 0.042 2.272 0.053 1.917 0.047 0.843 0.028
2013 2.110 0.068 1.825 0.062 1.828 0.060 2.395 0.076 2.038 0.067 0.915 0.042
2014 2.241 0.087 2.078 0.082 1.976 0.076 2.661 0.099 2.243 0.085 1.067 0.055
Average and standard deviation (s.d.) of the log number of firms at the exporter-HS2 product level for observations
in both EDD and DANE databases.
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Table C.3: Average HHI for Comparable Flows in EDD and DANE by Type of Firm
Proxy
Year EDD s.d. C s.d. H s.d. HC s.d. HP s.d. P s.d.
2004 -0.877 0.030 -1.077 0.035 -0.772 0.029 -1.097 0.035 -0.841 0.030 -0.809 0.029
2005 -0.912 0.028 -1.129 0.032 -0.828 0.026 -1.151 0.033 -0.906 0.027 -0.874 0.027
2006 -0.936 0.028 -1.084 0.032 -0.797 0.026 -1.109 0.032 -0.866 0.028 -0.833 0.027
2007 -0.946 0.028 -1.115 0.033 -0.813 0.028 -1.145 0.034 -0.895 0.029 -0.855 0.028
2008 -0.915 0.028 -1.080 0.031 -0.807 0.026 -1.114 0.032 -0.880 0.028 -0.837 0.027
2009 -0.927 0.027 -1.069 0.033 -0.785 0.027 -1.097 0.033 -0.864 0.029 -0.824 0.028
2010 -0.985 0.028 -1.145 0.033 -0.814 0.028 -1.176 0.034 -0.905 0.029 -0.862 0.028
2011 -0.982 0.029 -1.143 0.032 -0.834 0.026 -1.178 0.033 -0.921 0.028 -0.874 0.027
2012 -1.004 0.028 -1.156 0.031 -0.830 0.026 -1.185 0.032 -0.931 0.028 -0.888 0.027
2013 -1.036 0.040 -1.169 0.044 -0.845 0.036 -1.196 0.045 -0.957 0.039 -0.918 0.038
2014 -1.125 0.050 -1.281 0.054 -0.899 0.044 -1.304 0.055 -1.033 0.047 -0.993 0.046
Average and standard deviation (s.d.) of the log HHI at the exporter-HS2 product level for observations in both
EDD and DANE databases.
C.3 ANOVA
Although average indicators are useful to illustrate that aggregate trade and
the alternative proxies are similar to the true data in terms of levels, they are not
the relevant information for capturing the variation in the number of firms and
their internal distribution of market shares. Therefore, I do an ANOVA to compare
which proxy explains more variation of the true data for the exporter-product-year
observations that are present in both samples.
Table C.4: Proportion of Variance Explained by Each Firm Proxy for each Variable
(R2).
Proxy Imports Number of Firms HHI
Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional
C 0.731 0.221 0.615 0.054 0.400 0.079
H 0.731 0.221 0.630 0.048 0.315 0.053
HC 0.731 0.221 0.681 0.071 0.401 0.076
HP 0.731 0.221 0.632 0.051 0.324 0.056
P 0.731 0.221 0.368 0.006 0.316 0.059
Variance explained by each proxy (C, H, HC, HP , P ) and each variable (imports, number of firms and
HHI). Unconditional: R2 of regression lnXEDDcpt = β
u lnXproxypct + vcpt. Conditional: R
2 of regression
lnuEDDcpt = β
u lnuproxypct + vcpt, where lnu
y
cpt is the residual of the regression lnX
y
cpt = δcp + δpt + δct + εpct
(δcp, δpt and δct are exporter-product, product-year and exporter-year fixed effects).
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Table C.4 contains the proportion of the variance explained by each proxy
across products, exporters and years (R2). The unconditional columns show the R2
of the proxy alone, whereas the conditional columns show the R2 of the proxy after
conditioning by exporter-product, product-year and exporter-year fixed effects. The
latter captures the true variation used in the Chapter 2 regression results, given the
set of fixed effects used.
Given that the proxy is not needed to calculate imports, the first two columns
are the same across proxies. The unconditional R2 is 0.730, showing that the EDD
explains about three quarters of Colombian imports. Part of the unexplained vari-
ance may come from the fact that the origin of these databases are different and
valuations can differ. In this sense, the DANE database is collected by this single
agency, whereas the EDD is collected by each individual exporters. Moreover, the
World Bank does a cleaning process that may differ from the one I did for DANE
given their different goal. The conditional R2 is quite lower, at 0.22. Given that the
proxy does not modify this variable, I will use these values as benchmarks for the
number of firms and the HHI.
Columns 3 and 4 show the information for the number of firms. The uncon-
ditional R2 is quite similar toe the one for imports and across proxies with the
exception of P . The one that explains more is HC. The conditional R2 is lower
than the one for imports in all cases, capturing the fact that the fixed effects capture
some of the relevant information that the proxy can use. The HC is again the one
that explains the most. Columns 5 and 5 do the same for the case of the HHI, and
conclusions do not differ, with C also doing a relatively good job.
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As a conclusion, the proxy that performs better in capturing conditional and
unconditional variation in the number of firms and HHI is the CH. Therefore,
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